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Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 26 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation concerning attempts to distort the Russian position in the Security Council vote on the draft resolution on extending the mandate of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism to investigate cases of possible use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 99 (l) of the agenda, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

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Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 26 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation concerning the attempts to distort the Russian position in the Security Council vote on the draft resolution on extending the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation expected that, immediately after the draft resolution of the United States of America on extending the mandate of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) was vetoed, on 24 October, sharp attacks would be made on us by representatives of a number of Western countries. The level of brazenness was off the scale. We are not concerned about the attitude towards their own reputations of those who once again swooped in to mischaracterize our approach. Nevertheless they should be reminded about what is admissible in international affairs, and what should be avoided.

The Press Secretary of the White House, for example, went so far as to say that Moscow is endorsing "the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons against innocent women and children". The Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations did not hold back either, alleging that the Russian Federation "once again sides with the dictators and terrorists who use these weapons".

We call on our American colleagues to observe at least a minimum of decorum. In civilized international relations it is not acceptable to distort an opponent's position so crudely, simply in order to expose the opponent afterwards and cast the opponent in an unfavourable light. The White House and the State Department cannot fail to understand that what we were opposing was not an extension of the mandate of JIM, but the adoption of a hasty decision on the matter, without taking into account the anticipated report on the work of JIM over the past year, about which little is known as yet. In our view it would be unprofessional and irresponsible to follow the lead of the United States of America and mindlessly rubber stamp a far-reaching decision without even reviewing the situation. Indeed, such a review must be carried out, and in depth, for the following reasons:

The use of sarin in Syrian Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017 and the subsequent course of events demonstrated very serious systemic problems in the work of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission and JIM. This includes selective fulfilment of mandates, unpreparedness or inability to use the full range of investigation methods envisaged in the Chemical Weapons Convention, and outright refusal to conduct an investigation at the site of the incident, and even, as recently came to light, an attempt — involving the Fact-Finding Mission — to mislead the international community regarding the possibilities of safe access to Khan Shaykhun. It is clear that if we really want to identify the culprits in the use of chemical weapons, these basic deficits must be quickly remedied. But it seems that the current state of affairs is entirely satisfactory for Western colleagues. Indeed, they are desperately trying to leave everything as it is. And that is because their goal is not to establish the truth, but to use high-profile international structures to increase pressure on Damascus.

Back in April, when the Russian Federation was urging the immediate dispatch of inspectors to Khan Shaykhun and the Sha'irat airbase, where sarin used in Khan Shaykhun was allegedly stored, these countries blocked the draft decisions we proposed in the Security Council and in the OPCW Executive Council. There are

strong grounds to believe that these same countries subsequently put heavy pressure on the Fact-Finding Mission and JIM for their representatives not to go to those sites in the Syrian territory under any circumstances. They were able to insist on this because, in violation of international rules and norms, two British citizens head the Fact-Finding Mission.

The national reports of the United Kingdom, France and Turkey, which reached an unquestioned conclusion that the Syrian air force bears responsibility for the use of sarin in Khan Shaykun, constituted another form of pressure on the investigative structures and an attempt to "indoctrinate" them. The fact that the special services of these States had no problem taking samples at the site of the incident demonstrates how free and easy their operatives feel in territories controlled by the most radical Jihadist groups. However, these countries did not want to assist the representatives of the Fact-Finding Mission in visiting the site of the incident. Our request to share details of the national investigation was met by the British, for example, by a categorical refusal.

All this too is no accident. What this amounts to is a consistent course, which raises even bigger questions, taken by those who are now trying to attach labels to us. It is noteworthy that all attempts by the Russian Federation over the last few years to elicit a reaction from the Security Council to the crimes of terrorists using chemical weapons have been aggressively blocked every time by the Western "troika". This borders on open shielding of terrorists.

United Nations S/2017/904

Security Council

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Letter dated 26 October 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey herewith the seventh report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

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Annex

Letter dated 26 October 2017 from the Leadership Panel of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism addressed to the Secretary-General

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism has the honour to transmit its seventh report pursuant to Security Council resolutions 2235 (2015) and 2319 (2016) (see enclosure).

(*Signed*) Edmond **Mulet**
Head
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism

(*Signed*) Judy **Cheng-Hopkins**
Leadership Panel

(*Signed*) Stefan **Mogl**
Leadership Panel

Enclosure

Seventh report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism

I. Introduction

1. The seventh report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolutions 2235 (2015) and 2319 (2016). It covers the period from 23 June 2017, when the sixth report of the Mechanism (see S/2017/552) was submitted to the Council, to 25 October 2017.

II. Background

2. As set forth in resolutions 2235 (2015) and 2319 (2016), the mandate of the Mechanism is to identify, to the greatest extent feasible, individuals, entities, groups or Governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic where the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic determines or has determined that a specific incident in that country involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical. In accordance with resolution 2319 (2016), the mandate of the Mechanism will come to an end on 16 November 2017.

3. The Mechanism consists of an independent three-member panel together with a core staff of professionals selected on the basis of their expertise, taking into account geographical diversity and the equal participation of women and men. The Mechanism is headed by an Assistant Secretary-General, Edmond Mulet, with overall responsibility, and two deputies with responsibilities for investigative and political matters, respectively. Those three positions constitute the Leadership Panel of the Mechanism.

4. The Head of the Mechanism has continued to be supported by three components: the Investigative Office, the Political Office and the Planning and Operations Support Office. The Investigative Office is based in The Hague, Netherlands, and comprises two units: the Information Collection Unit and the Analysis and Corroboration Unit. The Political Office is based in New York, with a liaison officer in Damascus, and provides, inter alia, political analysis, legal advice, liaison, and media and information management support. The Planning and Operations Support Office is based in New York and provides administrative, logistical and planning support to the political and investigative components.

5. While the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic works to establish the facts surrounding allegations of the use of toxic chemicals for hostile purposes in the country, it is not mandated to reach conclusions about attributing responsibility for chemical weapons use.[1] Following a determination by the Fact-Finding Mission that a specific incident in the Syrian Arab Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons, the Mechanism conducts an investigation to identify, to the greatest extent feasible, the perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or those otherwise involved. In conducting its investigation, the Mechanism relies on findings of the Fact-Finding Mission regarding the use of chemicals as weapons in each incident and pursues a rigorous independent

[1] See S/2014/533, para. 14, and resolution 2235 (2015), eighth preambular para.

examination of the available information surrounding such use so as to identify, to the greatest extent feasible, those responsible.

6. As indicated in the sixth report of the Mechanism, the position of the Leadership Panel remains that, if new information is provided regarding the four cases initially referred to in the third and fourth reports of the Mechanism (see S/2016/738/Rev.1 and S/2016/888), supplementary investigations may be undertaken. For the present report, the Mechanism focused on incidents that had occurred at Umm Hawsh on 15 and 16 September 2016 and at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017.

III. Methods of work

7. The Mechanism is committed to the principles of impartiality, objectivity and independence in carrying out its work. The Mechanism continued to implement its mandate in accordance with the methods of work outlined in its previous reports, including in annex I to its third report (see S/2016/738/Rev.1). There are two main phases of the work of the Mechanism. During the first phase (information collection and planning for case development), the Mechanism reviews and analyses data, collects relevant information and creates a preliminary investigation plan. Following a decision by the Leadership Panel to conduct an in-depth investigation into a particular incident, the Mechanism requests full access to the information obtained or prepared by the Fact-Finding Mission.

8. The second phase (case investigation) commences thereafter, beginning with the preparation of an in-depth investigation plan, which includes the consideration of possible scenarios. During this phase, the Mechanism conducts detailed analysis of the information obtained by the Fact-Finding Mission and collects additional information from other sources, including its field missions. This work continues until the Mechanism is satisfied that it has gathered and assessed all of the information and evidence that it can reasonably obtain and, on that basis, presents its findings to the Security Council.

9. As an investigative mechanism without judicial powers, the Mechanism cannot compel the submission of information or documents to it, but relies on the voluntary cooperation of witnesses and those in possession of relevant information. In obtaining information and conducting analysis and assessment thereof, the Mechanism complied with the relevant terms of reference approved by the Security Council (see S/2015/669 and S/2015/697) and carried out its work in an independent and impartial manner. At all times, it was guided by the highest professional standards.

10. In preparing the investigation plan for each case, the Mechanism outlined a series of possible scenarios, including those put forward by Member States, based on all available information as to how the incidents might have occurred.

11. In conducting its investigations into the incidents at Umm Hawsh and Khan Shaykhun, the Mechanism undertook the following key activities: (a) obtaining and reviewing information and material from the Fact-Finding Mission; (b) collecting information from open sources; (c) submitting requests to Member States, including the Syrian Arab Republic, for information; (d) interviewing witnesses, including during visits to the Syrian Arab Republic, and obtaining photographs, videos, documents and other materials; (e) obtaining analysis and expert assessments from several forensic institutes; (f) obtaining satellite imagery and analysis thereof; (g) obtaining expert analysis in respect of medical effects, munitions and their delivery methods, aircraft configurations and capabilities, plume dispersion, and chemistry of toxic agents; (h) obtaining information about weather conditions; and

(i) attending expert briefings. Upon obtaining the above-mentioned information, the Mechanism conducted extensive analysis of the information and material that it had obtained.

12. With a view to identifying those responsible, the investigation was aimed at establishing, to the greatest extent feasible, the circumstances of the use of the chemical weapons, including in respect of the following: (a) the precise date and time of the incident; (b) the impact location; (c) the munition used; (d) the munition delivery method; and (e) the medical effects and response. In collecting and analysing the information relating the incidents, the Mechanism prepared a case file for each incident, documenting the information collected and the analysis performed in respect of each scenario.

13. Following an invitation by the Syrian Arab Republic to the Head of the Mechanism on 28 July 2017, and the Government's agreement that the Mechanism's liaison officer should take up his duties in Damascus, members of the Mechanism made several visits to the Syrian Arab Republic in support of the investigation. The Head of the Mechanism visited Damascus from 19 to 21 August, and the Mechanism's technical teams visited Damascus from 7 to 11 September and Sha'irat airbase from 8 to 10 October. Throughout its mandate, the Mechanism worked actively to obtain information from Member States, international and non-governmental organizations, individuals and other relevant entities.

14. The Mechanism did not visit the scenes of the incidents at Umm Hawsh and Khan Shaykhun. While the Leadership Panel considered that visits to those sites would have been of value, such value would diminish over time. Furthermore, the Panel was required to weigh the security risks of such visits against their possible benefits for the investigation.

15. With respect to Khan Shaykhun, the crater from which the sarin emanated had been disturbed after the incident and subsequently filled with concrete. Accordingly, the integrity of the scene had been compromised. The Leadership Panel considered that the high security risk of a site visit to Khan Shaykhun, which is currently in a situation of armed conflict and under the control of a listed terrorist organization (Nusrah Front), outweighed the possible benefits for the investigation. The Leadership Panel decided to keep the issue under review. Should conditions improve, and should it be determined that an on-site investigation would produce valuable new information, a visit could take place in the future. In that context, the Mechanism recently received an updated security advisory noting changes in the extent of the control exerted by various groups and additional parties involved, including increased complexity involving indirect artillery fire and recurrent air strikes.

16. Similarly, in the case of Umm Hawsh, the passage of time between the occurrence of the event in mid-September 2016 and the commencement of the Mechanism's investigation on 25 May 2017, and the fact that the integrity of the scene of the incident had not been preserved, called into question the value of such a visit. Moreover, in the light of the extensive information that the Mechanism had been able to obtain from witnesses, an on-site visit would have provided little additional value.

17. The Mechanism also noted that it would have been difficult to visit any of these sites without putting at risk persons who cooperated with it. Nevertheless, the Leadership Panel considered that the Mechanism had gathered sufficient information to come to a conclusion in both cases.

18. The Mechanism conducted interviews with more than 30 victims and witnesses who had been present at Umm Hawsh and Khan Shaykhun at the relevant

times, in addition to those interviewed by the Fact-Finding Mission. Regarding Umm Hawsh, these included victims of the attack, journalists who had been present in the immediate aftermath of the attack, doctors who had treated victims, and military commanders. Regarding the incident at Khan Shaykhun, witnesses included residents, personnel from Sha'irat airbase, government officials, doctors who had treated victims, rescue personnel and commanders of non-State armed groups.

19. The Mechanism obtained information regarding the physical characteristics of the sites through satellite imagery taken both before and after the incidents, the analysis of which assisted the Mechanism in determining the timing and precise location of the events being investigated. Moreover, the Mechanism collected numerous photographs and videos relating to the incidents both directly from witnesses and from other sources, including the Syrian Arab Republic. Those images and videos depict impact locations; impact effects, such as plumes and building damage; casualties; and munition remnants. The Mechanism obtained forensic analysis of more than 250 videos and photographs, including to determine their authenticity and the times and places at which they had been taken.

20. Given that a significant amount of the information collected by the Mechanism was available only in Arabic, including a large volume of medical records, interviews, logbooks and videos (more than 435 files), the Mechanism employed its own translators and established quality control measures in order to translate the materials into English so that they could be used by its investigators.

21. The Mechanism corroborated information considered important to its investigations and made assessments only on the basis of credible and reliable information. In that regard, identifying circular reporting was important in order to ensure that the corroboration was based on independent sources of information.

22. The Mechanism engaged several internationally recognized forensic and specialist defence institutes as well as OPCW-designated laboratories, considered to have established expertise and a record of outstanding performance, to provide forensic and expert support for the investigation. The forensic institutes and OPCW-designated laboratories are accredited in accordance with the International Organization for Standardization standard relating to a broad spectrum of laboratory work (ISO 17025). They were engaged by the Mechanism to authenticate photographs and video footage; to verify the times and places at which the photographs and footage had been taken; and to provide independent expert assessments and simulations with respect to items depicted, as well as chemical synthesis and analysis. The Mechanism also consulted with several internationally recognized experts in energetic materials and the medical effects of chemical warfare agents.

23. With regard to Umm Hawsh, expert analysis was provided in respect of the impact location; the munition used, its trajectory and its likely delivery method; and the medical effects on the victims. Regarding Khan Shaykhun, expert analysis was provided with respect to the nature of the plumes resulting from explosions; the characteristics of the crater and their likely cause; the remnants of the munitions; the dispersion of sarin; the explosives used and their delivery methods; and the medical effects and their treatment. In-depth expert analysis was also provided with respect to the chemistry of sarin.

Leadership Panel's assessment of the cases

24. The Leadership Panel reviewed the case files that had been prepared regarding the incidents, in which the Mechanism had carefully pieced together all available information to determine the evidence obtained in respect of the essential elements

of the cases. The results of the respective investigations were assessed according to the criteria of credibility and reliability.

25. The Leadership Panel determined that, in order to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons on the dates and at the times of the two incidents in which, according to the determination of the Fact-Finding Mission, such use had occurred, a finding must be made in accordance with the standards of evidence described in the first report of the Mechanism (see S/2016/142). The Panel also determined that it must be satisfied that the information used as the basis for its findings was credible and reliable and that each significant element was corroborated by information from independent sources, including forensic institutes and independent scientific experts.

IV. Assessment, findings and conclusion

A. Cases under investigation

26. *Umm Hawsh*. On 4 May 2017, the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council the report entitled "Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria regarding the incident of 16 September 2016, as reported in the note verbale of the Syrian Arab Republic, number 113, dated 29 November 2016" (see S/2017/400). In the section of that report entitled "Conclusions", the Fact-Finding Mission confirmed that the two female casualties reported to have been involved in the incident in Umm Hawsh of 16 September 2016 had been exposed to sulfur mustard.

27. *Khan Shaykhun*. Further to a status update by the Fact-Finding Mission regarding a reported incident in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017 (see S/2017/440), on 30 June 2017 the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council the document entitled "Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria regarding an alleged incident in Khan Shaykhun, Syrian Arab Republic, April 2017" (see S/2017/567). On the basis of its work, the Fact-Finding Mission had concluded that a large number of people, some of whom had died, had been exposed to sarin or a sarin-like substance, and that such a release could only be determined to have been the use of sarin as a chemical weapon.

B. Leadership Panel's assessments and findings

28. The following summarizes the work of the Mechanism and the assessment and findings of the Leadership Panel.

29. Full descriptions of the Mechanism's investigations into the incidents at Umm Hawsh and Khan Shaykhun are contained in annexes I and II, respectively.

Umm Hawsh

30. In conducting its comprehensive investigation into the case, the Mechanism used as a starting point the information and materials collected and prepared by the Fact-Finding Mission. It interviewed 10 witnesses in addition to those questioned by the Fact-Finding Mission and again interviewed the two victims. It also collected and reviewed significant amounts of additional material, including videos, photographs, satellite imagery and medical records. Furthermore, the Mechanism obtained independent expert assessments and analysis regarding the munitions used and their trajectory, as well as the medical effects on the victims and the treatment administered to them.

31. The Mechanism determined that the incident affecting the two victims had occurred on 15 September 2016 at approximately 1500 to 1600 hours. The

Mechanism made this finding on the basis of the following: medical records indicating that the victims had been admitted to Afrin Hospital on 16 September 2016, approximately 23 hours after their exposure to the chemical agent; witness interviews; and the determination of medical experts that the blisters of the victims would have been at least 12 hours old at the time of their initial hospitalization.

32. On the basis of further witness statements, satellite imagery and verified footage from the above-mentioned news crew, the Mechanism found that a second incident involving the use of chemical weapons had occurred on the following day, 16 September 2016, when a mortar shell had been lodged into the pavement between 1315 and 1500 hours.

33. On the basis of witness interviews, the Mechanism determined that a number of people in addition to the two victims interviewed by the Fact-Finding Mission might have been affected by sulfur mustard and in need of medical attention. Their symptoms ranged from slight to severe, with the two victims still suffering from the consequences to date. The Mechanism identified and interviewed only the two victims.

34. Regarding the make and origin of the mortar shells, forensic analysis determined that the mortar shell recovered from the pavement was of an improvised or makeshift origin. On the basis of witness descriptions and a comparative analysis of photographs of the mortar shells, experts determined the munition recovered from the house to be of the same type as the one found in the pavement.

35. The forensic institutes and individual experts determined the range of the mortar shells to be from 1 to 2 km. The delivery trajectory of the mortar shell found in the pavement was determined to have originated from a point somewhere to the east or south-east of the village. It was difficult to arrive at a precise determination as to the trajectory of the mortar shell that had hit the house. However, on the basis of the assessed trajectory of the mortar shell that had damaged the wall of the house, combined with that of the munition found in the pavement, forensic analysis indicated that the most likely launch point had been somewhere to the east or south-east of the village.

36. With respect to identifying those responsible, the Leadership Panel has determined that there is sufficient credible and reliable evidence of the following:

(a) The trajectory of the mortar shell found in the pavement was determined to have originated from a point somewhere to the east or south-east of the village. The damage to the victim's house indicated that the mortar shell that had caused it had originated from a point south-east of the village;

(b) Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was fighting against the Syrian Democratic Forces from the outskirts of Umm Hawsh on 15 and 16 September 2016;

(c) ISIL was positioned along three sides of Umm Hawsh, specifically to the east of the village (the assessed origin of the chemical mortar shells);

(d) Owing to the limited range (1 to 2 km) of the mortar shells, only ISIL and the Syrian Democratic Forces were within striking distance of the impact locations;

(e) As the Syrian Democratic Forces and ISIL were in active combat and witness statements and forensic analysis support the conclusion that the mortar shells came from the direction of ISIL-held areas, it is very unlikely that the Syrian Democratic Forces are responsible for the incident;

(f) Unlike ISIL, which was found by the Mechanism to have used sulfur mustard in Marea in August 2015 (see S/2016/738/Rev.1), there is no evidence that the Syrian Democratic Forces have used sulfur mustard in the past.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Leadership Panel is confident that ISIL is responsible for the use of sulfur mustard at Umm Hawsh on 15 and 16 September 2016. The findings of the Leadership Panel regarding the evidence in this case are based on the information set forth in detail in annex I.

Khan Shaykhun

37. Using the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission as a starting point, the Mechanism conducted a comprehensive investigation into the release of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. The Mechanism interviewed 17 witnesses in addition to those interviewed by the Fact-Finding Mission and collected and reviewed material not obtained by the Fact-Finding Mission. The Mechanism obtained substantial information on activities of the Syrian Arab Air Force on 4 April 2017.

38. The Mechanism examined eight possible scenarios regarding how the incident had occurred. On the basis of the information obtained, the following two scenarios were further investigated: (a) sarin had been released through an aerial bomb; or (b) sarin had been released through the explosion of an improvised explosive device placed on the ground. A third scenario with two alternatives was also investigated, neither of which was found to be linked to the release of sarin.

39. The Mechanism determined that sarin had been released from the location of a crater in the northern part of Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017.

40. On the basis of their review of photographs, videos and satellite images, the forensic institutes and individual experts engaged by the Mechanism determined that the crater had most likely been caused by a heavy object travelling at high velocity, such as an aerial bomb with a small explosive charge. Examining the munition remnants observed inside the crater, the institutes and experts concluded that the remnants were pieces of a thin-walled munition from 300 to 500 mm in diameter and were likely from an aerial bomb.

41. The Mechanism also examined whether an improvised explosive device could have caused the crater. While that possibility could not be completely ruled out, the experts determined that that scenario was less likely, because an improvised explosive device would have caused more damage to the surroundings than had been observed at the scene. Furthermore, no witnesses had reported the placement or explosion of an improvised explosive device from the ground.

42. The Mechanism received information about the operation of Syrian Arab Air Force aircraft in the area of Khan Shaykhun indicating that such aircraft may have been in a position to launch aerial bombs in the vicinity. At the same time, however, Syrian Arab Air Force flight records and other records provided by the Syrian Arab Republic make no mention of Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. Furthermore, a representative of the Syrian Arab Air Force stated to the Mechanism that no Syrian Arab Air Force aircraft had attacked Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017.

43. The Mechanism received conflicting information about the deployment of aircraft in Khan Shaykhun that morning. On 6 and 13 April 2017, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic had made public statements that the Syrian Arab Air Force had bombed Khan Shaykhun with conventional bombs at approximately 1130 to 1200 hours. Furthermore, the Mechanism obtained original video footage from two separate witnesses that showed four plumes caused by explosives across Khan

Shaykhun. The footage was confirmed by forensic analysis to be authentic and to have been filmed in Khan Shaykhun between 0642 and 0652 hours on 4 April 2017.

44. The Mechanism examined the nature of the rescue and health-care operations following the mass casualty situation caused by the release of sarin in Khan Shaykhun. At present, the Mechanism cannot verify the total number of persons who either died or were injured as a result of the attack, but concludes, on the basis of its interviews with victims and medical personnel, its review of medical records and its consultations with medical experts whom it has engaged, that the response to the incident largely correlated to the reported number of casualties and victims.

45. The Mechanism commissioned an in-depth laboratory study of the origin of the precursor chemical methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF) used to produce the binary sarin released in Khan Shaykhun. The study revealed that the sarin had most likely been made with the precursor DF from the original stock from the Syrian Arab Republic. An initial screening of reports concerning previous incidents of the release of sarin in the Syrian Arab Republic showed that some "marker chemicals" appeared to be present in environmental samples. This would warrant further study. This finding relates only to the origin of the DF used as a precursor, not to those responsible for the dissemination of sarin.

46. With respect to identifying those responsible, the Leadership Panel has determined that the information that it has obtained constitutes sufficient credible and reliable evidence of the following:

(a) Aircraft dropped munitions over Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017;

(b) An aircraft of the Syrian Arab Republic was in the immediate vicinity of Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017;

(c) The crater from which the sarin emanated was created on the morning of 4 April 2017;

(d) The crater was caused by the impact of an aerial bomb travelling at high velocity;

(e) A large number of people were affected by sarin between 0630 and 0700 hours on the morning of 4 April 2017;

(f) The number of persons affected by the release of sarin on 4 April 2017, and the fact that sarin reportedly continued to be present at the site of the crater 10 days after the incident, indicate that a large amount of sarin was likely released, which is consistent with its being dispersed through a chemical aerial bomb;

(g) The symptoms of victims and their medical treatment, as well as the scale of the incident, are consistent with a large-scale intoxication of sarin;

(h) The sarin identified in the samples taken from Khan Shaykhun was found to have most likely been made with a precursor (DF) from the original stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic;

(i) The irregularities described in annex II are not of such a nature as to call into question the aforementioned findings.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Leadership Panel is confident that the Syrian Arab Republic is responsible for the release of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. The findings of the Leadership Panel regarding the evidence in this case are based on the information set forth in detail in annex II.

V. Other activities

A. Interaction with Member States and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Syrian Arab Republic

47. In accordance with resolution 2235 (2015), the Syrian Arab Republic, and all parties in that country, are to fully cooperate with the Mechanism, including by providing full access to all locations, individuals and materials in the Syrian Arab Republic that the Mechanism deems relevant to its investigation. The Syrian Arab Republic engaged constructively with the Mechanism and demonstrated its commitment to cooperating with the Mechanism and facilitating its requests for access to information and witnesses. The Mechanism maintained regular contact with the relevant authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic.

48. The Mechanism engaged with the Syrian Arab Republic for planning purposes, including by requesting that a liaison officer be based in Damascus. The Mechanism received a positive response to that request on 11 July 2017 and thereafter commenced planning to visit the country.

49. In letters dated 5 and 19 July 2017, the Head of the Mechanism requested that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic provide official records regarding arrangements and movements at Sha'irat airbase with respect to 4 April 2017.

50. During the first visit to Damascus by members of the Leadership Panel, from 19 to 21 August 2017, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic provided all materials requested by the Mechanism. During that mission, the Head of the Mechanism met with representatives of the Government, including the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates and members of the armed forces.

51. During the Mechanism's second visit to Damascus, from 7 to 11 September 2017, a technical team of the Mechanism conducted witness interviews, collected information and met with representatives of the Government, including officials from the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre.

52. During its third visit, from 8 to 10 October 2017, the Mechanism went to Sha'irat airbase. After having received information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic during its first and second visits to Damascus, the Mechanism considered that such a visit would be of value to its investigation into the incident at Khan Shaykhun. The technical visit had the following objectives: (a) to verify the authenticity of the logbooks and flight operations records from 4 April 2017; (b) to review entry and exit logs and interview responsible personnel; (c) to photograph the types of munitions flown on 4 April 2017 in accordance with the logs received; and (d) to photograph the mechanisms for attaching such munitions onto Sukhoi Su-22 aircraft. Collecting samples at the airbase was not an objective of the visit; the Mechanism had determined that doing so would not advance the investigation. The Mechanism considered that if a single chemical munition had been flown from the airbase, there was little chance of finding any trace of sarin or its degradation products at an airbase of that size without specific information as to where to collect samples.

53. In addition to carrying out those visits to the Syrian Arab Republic, the Leadership Panel held regular meetings with representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic in New York.

54. As stated in the fourth, fifth and sixth reports of the Mechanism (see S/2016/888, S/2017/131 and S/2017/552), on 10 October 2016 the Syrian Arab Republic notified the Mechanism that the Syrian national committee had opened an

internal investigation, which included flight plans and air operations. To date, the Syrian Arab Republic has not provided the Mechanism with the outcomes of the investigation.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

55. The Mechanism's investigation initially commenced with a comprehensive review and analysis of all the information collected and prepared by the Fact-Finding Mission regarding the two cases. This comprised 2,554 files, which included documents, video interviews, audio recordings, photographs and laboratory results.

56. OPCW provided the Mechanism with three technical experts who were deployed with the Mechanism's technical team to visit Sha'irat airbase. The experts provided the Mechanism with additional specialized skills, including to ensure the safety of the operation.

57. OPCW also provided invaluable support through its laboratory and its designated laboratory network.

58. The Leadership Panel was in regular contact with the Director-General of OPCW both from New York and in The Hague. Moreover, the Mechanism interacted with OPCW on a frequent basis throughout the Mechanism's mandate.

Information from Member States

59. The Leadership Panel sent formal requests for information to Member States, including the Syrian Arab Republic, members of the Security Council and countries in the region, on three occasions. The requests for information were sent on 15 June 2017, regarding the case at Umm Hawsh; on 5 July 2017, regarding the case at Khan Shaykhun; and on 30 August 2017, regarding both cases. The Mechanism also sent tailored follow-up requests regarding both cases to a number of Member States that had responded to the initial requests.

60. Twelve Member States provided case-specific information, which was subjected to the same rigorous review and analysis as other information gathered. The Mechanism always sought to collect additional material from at least one other independent source for corroboration purposes.

61. Throughout the reporting period, the Leadership Panel met with Member States, including members of the Security Council. This was also an opportunity to brief Member States on the general status of the work of the Mechanism and to engage with regional States. In addition, members of the Leadership Panel visited the capitals of four Member States, including the Syrian Arab Republic, at their invitation, to be briefed on specific aspects of the two cases.

Allegations from Member States

62. Since the issuance of its sixth report on 28 June 2017, the Mechanism has formally received 15 allegations related to non-State actors' acquisition, possession or transfer of, or intent to use, chemical weapons or toxic chemicals. Two allegations specifically referred to ISIL. Thirteen allegations also included the acquisition of missiles and rockets fitted with toxic chemicals by non-State actors, including seven allegations involving the Nusrah Front. Those allegations were shared with OPCW.

B. Consultation with United Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies

63. In fulfilling its mandate, the Mechanism consulted appropriate United Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies to exchange information, as encouraged in resolution 2319 (2016), including with the experts of those bodies.

C. Information management

64. The Mechanism took measures to ensure that its personnel complied with the confidentiality and security protection requirements set out in the memorandum of understanding concluded between the Mechanism and OPCW on 26 November 2015, concerning the provision of access to and the storage and handling of information.

65. All personnel and all other individuals and entities with whom the Mechanism engaged were also required to enter into confidentiality undertakings.

66. The Mechanism followed standard operating procedures and guidelines on information management (see S/2016/888, annex), as well as on the conduct of interviews and the collection of evidence and information, including chain-of-custody forms. In addition, the Mechanism applied the Secretary-General's bulletin on information sensitivity, classification and handling (ST/SGB/2007/6) in relation to the information collected and produced by the Mechanism. Furthermore, relevant sections of the Secretary-General's bulletin on record-keeping and the management of United Nations archives (ST/SGB/2007/5), concerning the creation, management and disposition of records, were applied by the Mechanism.

VI. Challenges, risks and constraints

67. While the Mechanism actively collected information relevant to its investigations from a range of sources, it also depended on Member States to assist by providing quality information in a timely manner.

68. The conditions for receiving information in a highly sensitive political environment with complex security considerations made the investigation extremely challenging. On-site visits were subject to high security risks. Moreover, as an investigative body without judicial powers, the Mechanism relied on the voluntary cooperation of witnesses, was required to meet strict standards of confidentiality in all its operations, and was to ensure the safety of witnesses without any means of witness protection.

VII. Way forward

69. The Leadership Panel understands that several additional cases are currently subject to fact-finding missions. On the basis of its recent work, the Leadership Panel commends the continued scientific progress and development that have provided invaluable support for complex investigations of this nature. In that regard, it is important to maintain and enhance a network of internationally recognized experts on these issues.

70. The Leadership Panel notes that the investigations conducted during the reporting period provided a series of important lessons for future investigations of this nature, which should be captured by conducting a comprehensive lessons-learned exercise.

71. It is vital that the international community maintain an effective investigative capacity to rapidly respond to any future use of chemical weapons, including acts of chemical terrorism.

VIII. Concluding remarks

72. The Leadership Panel is deeply concerned by the finding of the Fact-Finding Mission that chemical weapons — sulfur mustard and sarin — were used. The Panel expresses its shock and dismay at the existence and use of these weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, and its deep sympathy to those affected by them. The Panel encourages the international community not only to make united efforts to ensure that such use will not be repeated, but also to provide assistance to those affected.

73. The continuing use of chemical weapons, including by non-State actors, is deeply disturbing. If such use, notwithstanding its prohibition by the international community, is not stopped now, a lack of consequences will surely encourage others to follow, not only in the Syrian Arab Republic, but also elsewhere. This is the time to bring these acts to an end.

74. The Leadership Panel wishes to give recognition to the professionalism, dedication and sacrifice of its staff, and to express its deep appreciation for all their work and commitment during the reporting period.

75. The Leadership Panel extends its appreciation for the support received from the United Nations Secretariat, in particular the Office for Disarmament Affairs, and from OPCW, which provided invaluable technical and logistical support to the Mechanism.

Annex I

Umm Hawsh

I. Findings of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic

1. On the basis of interviews conducted with witnesses, including a visit to the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre in Barzah to conduct physical examinations of items related to the reported incidents, the documents reviewed and the results of blood sample analyses, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic confirmed that the two female casualties reported to have been involved in the incidents in Umm Hawsh on 15 and 16 September 2016 had been exposed to sulfur mustard. Furthermore, the Fact-Finding Mission stated that it had conducted a thorough technical weapon exploitation on a 217-mm-calibre mortar. Supported by the results of laboratory analyses, the Fact-Finding Mission determined that that mortar shell contained sulfur mustard.

II. Investigation by the Mechanism

2. The Mechanism formulated possible scenarios to ensure that it approached the investigation comprehensively and in an objective and impartial manner. While the Mechanism sought to collect and analyse as much information as possible in connection with each scenario, by the end of the investigation most of the information obtained supported one scenario: that sulfur mustard munitions, one of which had caused the exposure of the victims, had been fired on Umm Hawsh by an actor.

Background

3. Umm Hawsh (also known as Um Hosh) is a village in Aleppo Governorate (Marea subdistrict, I'zaz District). It is located at coordinates 36°24'51.12"N, 37°12'38.16"E, in the midst of a triangle of three larger cities: Aleppo, I'zaz and Bab. Umm Hawsh is approximately 23 km north-east of Aleppo city and 35 km south of the Bab al-Salam border crossing with Turkey. It is located in a fork between two motorways to the north of Aleppo, that is, east of the M214 and west of the M20 motorways.

4. In 2004, the population of Umm Hawsh, according to Syrian census data from that year, was 3,542. At the time of the incidents in September 2016, the population of Umm Hawsh was estimated to be 728.

5. Umm Hawsh and the surrounding area fell under the control of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on 9 August 2015. It was taken over by the Syrian Democratic Forces on 30 August 2016. Additional non-State armed groups were present approximately 8 km to the north of Umm Hawsh, in Marea. The forces of the Syrian Arab Republic and its allies were not present in Umm Hawsh at the time of the incidents; the closest that they appear to have been was 8.7 km away in Misqan. By the time of the sulfur mustard incident, the front-line and conflict dynamics had not changed since Umm Hawsh had been captured by the Syrian Democratic Forces on 30 August 2016. At that time, ISIL remained from 600 to 800 m east and 1 km north of the village, with an additional presence to the south of the village.

Date and time

6. The incident leading to the exposure of the victims to sulfur mustard has been determined to have occurred at a house in Umm Hawsh at approximately 1500 to 1600 hours on Thursday, 15 September 2016. The Mechanism based that finding on the following: medical records indicating that the victims had been admitted to Afrin Hospital on 16 September 2016, approximately 23 hours after their exposure to the chemical agent; witness interviews; and the assessment of medical experts that the blisters of the victims would have been at least 12 hours old at the time of their initial hospitalization.

7. The Mechanism found that the following day, Friday, 16 September, a mortar shell had been lodged in a pavement in the village at approximately 1315 to 1500 hours. That assessment is based on verified media footage, witness statements and analysis of satellite imagery.

Impact location

8. The Mechanism determined the location of the house[1] struck by a mortar shell through a variety of means. One of the victims, who lived in the house, identified the location on the basis of photographs presented during an interview with the Mechanism. The photographs included images of the house, the street and the village. Moreover, the information regarding the location of the house was corroborated through forensic analysis, the statements of several other witnesses, a review of satellite imagery and the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission. The identification of the location was also supported by original videos provided to the Mechanism showing damage to the house.

9. The mortar shell in the pavement was determined to be located at approximately 36°24′43.29″N, 37°12′31.16″E. The identification of the location was based on forensic analysis of video footage taken by news crews who filmed the munition still protruding from the pavement. The finding regarding the location of the mortar shell in the pavement was corroborated through analysis of satellite imagery, the statements of three witnesses and the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission and the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence team of the Russian Federation.

Munition analysis

10. Several witnesses interviewed by the Mechanism confirmed that a mortar shell or a munition had hit the house of one of the two victims. The mortar shell had not been recovered, as the owner of the house had thrown it away sometime after the incident. However, a news crew had photographed a damaged mortar shell the following day and provided images to the Mechanism. The owner of the house identified the mortar shell from photographs taken by the news crew. A forensic institute and an expert engaged by the Mechanism who specializes in energetic materials stated that the mortar shell that had hit the house was very likely the same type as the mortar shell found in the pavement. A defence research institute, a forensic institute and an expert consultant, all engaged by the Mechanism, observed that the mortar shell recovered from the pavement was of poor production quality. After the munition had hit the house, five witnesses described qualities, such as smell, indicating that the mortar shell contained sulfur mustard.

[1] While the Mechanism obtained the geographical coordinates of the house damaged by the mortar, its location is not included in the present report as a result of concern for the safety and security of the victims.

11. With respect to the origin of the mortar shells, experts in energetic materials noted that the mortar shell recovered from the pavement had an appearance similar to those made through makeshift large-scale production methods. The Fact-Finding Mission established that the munition found in the pavement was a 217-mm-calibre mortar shell. Mortars fitting 217-mm-calibre mortar shells are easily produced from available high-quality steel tubing. The range of such munitions is from 1 to 2 km. On the basis of the limited information available, a defence research institute commissioned by the Mechanism concluded that it was impossible to identify the manufacturer(s) of the munitions.

12. Regarding the characteristics of the munition that had caused damage to the house, an expert in energetic materials noted that, on the basis of a review of photographs and video footage, the damage was consistent with having been caused by a mortar shell fired from a mortar with a calibre of approximately 220 mm. According to the Fact-Finding Mission, the mortar shell in the pavement contained sulfur mustard. The pavement was not seriously damaged, and there was likely residual contamination from the leaking munition. A forensic institute observed that the lack of a major explosion suggested that these mortar shells were designed to carry a chemical agent. Regarding the penetration of the pavement by the mortar shell, two experts in energetic materials observed that it had occurred with little sign of damage to either the mortar shell or the pavement itself. Both experts tried to find an explanation, with one noting that there was little resistance in the pavement because of an observed pre-existing cavity, which the mortar shell had penetrated.

13. With respect to the range of the mortar shells, forensic institutes and experts commissioned by the Mechanism determined the distance from where they had been launched to the impact site to be from 1 to 2 km. They also noted that the range and accuracy of homemade mortar shells are imprecise and depend on a number of variables, including the amount of explosive powder used.

14. In addition, the same experts determined the trajectory of the mortar shell found in the pavement to have originated from a point to the east or south-east of the village. Witnesses confirmed that it had originated from the eastern side of Umm Hawsh. The assessed trajectory of the mortar shell that had struck the house was less precise, as it was based on the damage caused to the wall of the house. That trajectory was determined to be an arc from due east to nearly due west, with its subjective central line originating from the south-east.

Medical effects and response

15. When interviewed by the Mechanism, the victim stated that, upon finding the house had been damaged by the mortar shell, she had commenced cleaning the house with her bare hands using laundry detergent. She later asked a neighbour to help. Both cleaned for approximately four hours, until after the Maghrib call to prayer. The owner of the house reported becoming sick at about that time, including experiencing visual impairment. She took a shower, and later felt dizzy and vomited. The following morning, members of the Syrian Democratic Forces took the victim to Tall Rif'at Hospice; however, no doctors were available at the time. Later that day, they went to Afrin Hospital, where the victim lost consciousness. A week later, the victim awakened with bandaged hands. She was subsequently admitted to a hospital in Damascus. The neighbour who helped to clean the house also became sick and went to the hospital.

16. The Mechanism also interviewed the victim's neighbour, who stated that she had tried to clean the "oil" away using water and laundry detergent. At the start of the cleaning process, the victim could smell the chemical, but then grew somewhat accustomed to it. She went home to take a shower and later became dizzy and could

not eat or drink. After going to a relative's house, the victim fell to the ground and began to vomit, before losing consciousness. By the next morning, she could no longer see and was transported to a hospital by relatives. They first went to Ahras Medical Centre, where the victim was treated. By that time, her whole body had become swollen and had developed blisters. By 1000 to 1100 hours, the victim had been taken to Afrin Hospital, where she stayed for 20 days. Still in poor condition, the victim then went to Kafr Naya Hospice and later to a hospital in Damascus. The victim could not speak, and her chest felt tight for a month.

17. Several sources indicate that other civilians and three fighters from non-State armed groups were also affected by the chemical incident. This information is only partially corroborated by one witness, who stated that Afrin Hospital had received one male adult and two children with mild symptoms as ambulant patients on 16 September 2016. Another witness suggested that a number of children had also been affected and taken to the hospital. This could not be corroborated by the Mechanism. Another witness insisted that the hospital had not received additional patients with similar symptoms, but only those two cases.

18. An additional witness indicated to the Mechanism that a relative had cleaned the furniture contaminated with sulfur mustard and, as a result, had developed minor symptoms on the fingers.

19. While a number of other people may have been affected by the sulfur mustard incident and needed medical attention, only two of them were identified and interviewed by the Mechanism. The victims' symptoms included large blisters on their upper and lower limbs and faces; they continue to suffer from the consequences of sulfur mustard exposure to date. Clinical toxicologists engaged by the Mechanism confirmed the exposure of the victims to sulfur mustard and noted that it might have permanent implications for their health.

Chemistry

20. The chemical agent that affected the victims is sulfur mustard. It is a blistering agent whose precursor chemicals are relatively cheap and easy to acquire.

21. The Fact-Finding Mission conducted chemical analysis of the samples of sulfur mustard. It concluded that the presence and relevant quantities of disulfide and trisulfide mustard analogues indicated that this mustard was most likely produced using the Levinstein chemical reaction process, which is widely understood to be an alternative and relatively uncomplicated method of producing sulfur mustard to which non-State actors might turn.

22. Witnesses and open sources point to ISIL as a possible perpetrator of the chemical attack. Information provided to the Mechanism indicates that ISIL had developed the capability to produce sulfur mustard as of 2015. ISIL had ample access to industrial zones, including oil and gas fields, in which to produce the relevant delivery systems, munitions and chemicals. ISIL has a historical record of using sulfur mustard, including in August 2015 in Marea (just 7.4 km north of Umm Hawsh). In its third report (S/2016/738/Rev.1), the Mechanism found that ISIL had the capacity to produce sulfur mustard through the Levinstein process.

III. Assessment and findings by the Leadership Panel

23. In order to determine, to the greatest extent feasible, those who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of sulfur mustard on 15 and 16 September 2016 in Umm Hawsh, the Leadership Panel requested that the investigators examine four possible scenarios regarding how the events had

unfolded. Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the prevailing scenario that emerged was that sulfur mustard munitions, one of which had caused the exposure of victims, had been fired on Umm Hawsh by an actor.

24. Most of the information collected and analysed by the Mechanism supports this scenario. The majority of the evidence suggests that the munitions were fired from a location to the east or south-east, where one particular actor (ISIL) was positioned at the time of the incident.

25. With respect to identifying those responsible, the Leadership Panel has determined that the information that it has obtained constitutes sufficient credible and reliable evidence of the following:

(a) The trajectory of the mortar shell found in the pavement was determined to have originated from a point to the east or south-east of the impact location. The damage caused to the victim's house indicated that the trajectory of the mortar shell that had caused it had originated from a point to the south-east;

(b) ISIL was fighting against the Syrian Democratic Forces from the outskirts of Umm Hawsh on 15 and 16 September 2016;

(c) ISIL was positioned along three sides of Umm Hawsh, specifically to the east and south-east of the village (the assessed origin of the chemical mortar shells);

(d) Owing to the limited range (1 to 2 km) of the mortar shells, only ISIL and the Syrian Democratic Forces were within striking distance of the impact locations;

(e) As the Syrian Democratic Forces and ISIL were in active combat and witness statements and forensic analysis support the conclusion that the mortar shell came from the direction of ISIL-held areas, it is very unlikely that the Syrian Democratic Forces were responsible for the incident;

(f) Unlike ISIL, which was found by the Mechanism to have used sulfur mustard in Marea in August 2015 (see S/2016/738/Rev.1), there is no evidence that the Syrian Democratic Forces have used sulfur mustard in the past.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Leadership Panel is confident that ISIL is responsible for the use of sulfur mustard at Umm Hawsh on 15 and 16 September 2016. The findings of the Leadership Panel regarding the evidence in this case are based on the information set forth in detail in the present annex.

Annex II

Khan Shaykhun

I. Findings of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic

1. On the basis of its analysis of biomedical specimens, interviews and supplementary material submitted during the interview process, as well as analysis of environmental samples, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic found that a large number of people, some of whom had died, had been exposed to sarin or a sarin-like substance at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. While it had received limited information on the dispersal mechanism and therefore had been unable to draw firm conclusions on that specific matter, it considered that the release that had caused the exposure was likely to have been initiated in the crater in the road, located close to the silos in the northern part of the town. It concluded that, on the basis of such a release, the only determination that could be made was that sarin had been used as a weapon.

II. Investigation by the Mechanism

2. Upon receiving the final report of the Fact-Finding Mission on the incident of 4 April 2017 at Khan Shaykhun, the Mechanism conducted an in-depth investigation into the incident. The Leadership Panel defined the scope of the investigation by adopting an investigation plan that outlined eight possible scenarios, including those put forward by Member States, regarding how sarin had been released in Khan Shaykhun. While the Mechanism sought to collect and analyse as much information as possible in connection with each scenario, by the end of the investigation most of the information obtained supported three scenarios: (a) sarin had been delivered through an aerial bomb that had been dropped by an aircraft; (b) sarin had been released from the ground as part of a staged attack; or (c) there had been an air strike by the Syrian Arab Air Force against a storage facility containing toxic chemicals, which had resulted in the dispersion of a toxic cloud.

3. The first scenario is based on reports that aircraft were either seen or heard dropping bombs over Khan Shaykhun early in the morning on 4 April 2017. Sarin is believed to have emanated from a point of impact on a road (hereinafter referred to as "the crater") caused by an aerial bomb, located close to silos in the northern part of Khan Shaykhun.

4. The second scenario is based on a report that sarin was released from the same crater as that in the first scenario, caused by an explosive charge placed on the ground containing sarin, so as to stage an attack for which the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic would be blamed.

5. The third scenario involves a reported strike by the Syrian Arab Air Force on an ammunition depot on the eastern outskirts of Khan Shaykhun where workshops had been producing chemical warfare munitions. In a public statement, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic stated that the Syrian Arab Air Force had only conducted an attack in Khan Shaykhun at around noon on 4 April 2017. An alternative third scenario is that a house in Khan Shaykhun that had been taken over by a non-State armed group and used for the storage of toxic chemicals was bombed on 4 April 2017, thus releasing toxic chemicals.

Background

6. Khan Shaykhun is both a town and a subdistrict of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man District, within the governorate of Idlib in north-western Syrian Arab Republic, with the coordinates 35.44°N, 36.65°E, at 376 m above sea level. Located about 10 km from the border of Hama Governorate to the south and about 100 km from Aleppo Governorate to the north, Khan Shaykhun is positioned on the M5 motorway, which runs from the Jordanian border in the southern part of the country, through Damascus city and to Aleppo city in the northern part of the country.

7. Recent information available to the Mechanism estimates that the subdistrict of Khan Shaykhun has a population of approximately 34,000, with the town itself having a population of 16,000.

8. A review of open-source information indicates that, in mid-2014, the Nusrah Front launched an offensive in southern Idlib Governorate and seized the town of Khan Shaykhun. According to witness statements as well as open sources, on the date of the incident on 4 April 2017, the Levant Liberation Organization, which includes the Nusrah Front as its major component, had a prominent presence in the area of Khan Shaykhun, with Ahrar al-Sham also being present in the general area, along with several other non-State armed groups.

9. A review of open sources also indicates that, on 21 March 2017, the Levant Liberation Organization and its allied groups launched an offensive against forces of the Syrian Arab Republic in the direction of Hama city from its positions in northern Hama Governorate. By 23 March 2017, the Levant Liberation Organization and its allied groups reportedly advanced to areas 3 to 5 km from the Hama city line and threatened to capture the Hama military airport. On 24 March 2017, Ahrar al-Sham and its allied groups reportedly launched a separate offensive in north-western Hama Governorate. Open-source information suggests that at around the same time, Syrian government forces started to gain momentum, although with some temporary setbacks, in repelling these attacks. Reinforcements reportedly arrived from other parts of the Syrian Arab Republic. Syrian government forces were also reportedly aided in repelling air attacks on locations in northern Hama and southern Idlib governorates. According to the Director-General of OPCW, sarin was found to have been released in Lataminah on 30 March 2017. By 3 April 2017, Syrian government forces had made rapid advances, reportedly regaining control over most of the areas lost after 21 March 2017, and had moved deeper into some of the areas that had been controlled by non-State armed groups prior to 21 March. Media sources indicate that, between 17 March and 3 April 2017, aerial attacks were carried out on a regular basis against targets in Khan Shaykhun.

Date and time

10. On the basis of witness statements and forensic analysis of photographs and video footage, the Mechanism found that the sarin incident had occurred in Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours local time on 4 April 2017. Moreover, the Mechanism collected multiple reports released by the media during the morning of 4 April 2017, which indicated that a "chemical attack" had occurred in Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours.

11. Witnesses reported that the alleged attack in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017 had been carried out by an aircraft between 0630 and 0700 hours. The Mechanism obtained original photographs and video footage from witnesses showing plumes on the morning of 4 April 2017, indicating that several explosions had occurred in Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours. On the basis of forensic analysis, it was determined that the plume videos and images had been recorded on 4 April

2017 between 0642 and 0652 hours. Further forensic analysis confirmed that the footage had not been manipulated and had been taken on the outskirts of Khan Shaykhun.

12. Moreover, on the basis of satellite images from 3 April 2017, which do not show the presence of the crater at that time, the Mechanism has confidence that the crater was caused by an impact on 4 April 2017.

Early warning

13. Witnesses interviewed by the Mechanism described an "early warning system" (commonly referred to as "spotters", "observers" or "observatories") that possibly played a role in warning residents of the attack on 4 April 2017. By intercepting communications between aircraft of the Syrian Arab Air Force and the bases from which they are operated, members of the spotter network monitor flight activities and communicate early warning information to residents about impending air strikes.

14. The Mechanism collected information from witnesses to the effect that a first warning of a possible upcoming chemical attack had been received by the "Syria Civil Defence" (also known as the "White Helmets") and spotters in Khan Shaykhun. Witnesses stated that the Syria Civil Defence in Khan Shaykhun had been in contact by way of the Internet with spotters and that, at approximately 0630 hours on 4 April 2017, the spotters had announced that a Sukhoi Su-22 military aircraft had taken off from Sha'irat airbase. A witness interviewed by the Mechanism, who reported having worked that morning as a spotter in Khan Shaykhun, recalled having received an alert concerning the take-off of a Su-22 from Sha'irat airbase on the morning of 4 April 2017. The witness stated that the alert had advised residents to be careful, as the aircraft was likely carrying toxic chemicals.

15. The Mechanism noted several witness statements suggesting that, on the morning of 4 April 2017, the early warning system might not have been fully functional. The Syria Civil Defence reported that, when the members of the first volunteer team had responded to the air strike, they had had no idea that it was a chemical attack and that they had all been poisoned. Several witnesses stated that there had been no warning of an attack on the morning of 4 April, while others reported having received alerts at various times between 0630 and 0715 hours that morning.

16. While there are varying accounts as to whether the early warning system was fully functional that morning, the above information gathered by the Mechanism neither supports nor excludes any of the three scenarios.

Air deployment

17. While there are varying accounts of the nature and timing of the attack, and the subsequent number of explosions, several witnesses interviewed by the Mechanism and the Fact-Finding Mission stated that they had seen or heard aircraft flying over Khan Shaykhun in the early morning of 4 April 2017, in keeping with the scenario in which aircraft dropped bombs on Khan Shaykhun that morning.

18. The Mechanism collected two original videos, filmed by two witnesses from different angles, showing several plumes; the videos were confirmed by forensic institutes to have been filmed between 0642 and 0652 hours during the morning of 4 April 2017. Forensic analysis of the videos found that, at a certain point in each video, the sound of an aircraft could be heard in the background along with an explosion.

19. The Mechanism investigated whether a Syrian Arab Air Force Su-22 had taken off from Sha'irat airbase, located 110 km south of Khan Shaykhun, and launched an air attack on the town that morning. The Governments of France and the United States of America publicly provided information indicating that a Syrian Arab Air Force Su-22 had taken off from Sha'irat airbase on 4 April 2017, flown over Khan Shaykhun at 0637 and 0646 hours, and launched up to six attacks around Khan Shaykhun.

20. The Mechanism requested that the Syrian Arab Republic provide official records with respect to activities carried out at Sha'irat airbase on 4 April 2017, including logbooks of all operations, movements at the airbase, flights, names of the pilots flying aircraft and a detailed map or plan showing the layout of the airbase. In response to that request, the Government provided the Mechanism with a set of copies of official documents relating to Sha'irat airbase, including extracts from handwritten Syrian Arab Air Force logbooks as well as a document detailing the airbase chain of command and an aerial image of the airbase.

21. During its visit to Sha'irat airbase, the Mechanism observed that the documents provided by the Syrian Arab Republic appeared to be copies of the originals. The technical visit had the following objectives: (a) to verify the authenticity of the logbooks and flight operation records from 4 April 2017; (b) to review entry and exit logs and interview responsible personnel; (c) to photograph the types of munitions flown on 4 April in accordance with logs received; and (d) to photograph the mechanisms by which such munitions were attached to Su-22 aircraft.

22. The Mechanism found no entries in any of the documents that referred specifically to Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. Two entries in a logbook provided details regarding the time of execution of missions that corresponded to the time frame of the release of sarin at Khan Shaykhun. The operations relating to those flights had been logged as aerial attacks using conventional munitions targeting non-State armed groups in the vicinity of Kafr Zayta and Tall Hawash, situated approximately 8 km south-west and 18 km west of Khan Shaykhun, respectively.

23. The Mechanism interviewed the pilot associated with one of the entries in the logbook, who used the call sign "Quds 1" and had flown a Su-22 at the relevant time that day. The pilot stated that no chemical weapons had been used and that the mission that morning had been to carry out an attack to the west of Kafr Zayta using three 500 kg conventional munitions. This was found to be consistent with the details recorded in the logbook. According to the pilot, the closest distance to Khan Shaykhun flown on that date had been approximately 7 to 9 km, to carry out an attack against targets west of Kafr Zayta. While the Mechanism was able to confirm severe structural damage to a building in the general vicinity of one of those targets through analysis of satellite imagery, it could not precisely determine when the damage had occurred.

24. The Mechanism did not interview the pilot associated with the second entry. The Syrian Arab Republic informed the Mechanism that the pilot had later been shot down and was missing in action.

25. Taking samples was not an objective of the visit to Sha'irat airbase. The Mechanism had determined that the collection of samples at the airbase would not advance the investigation. The Mechanism considered that if a single chemical munition had been flown from that base, there was little chance of finding any trace of sarin or its degradation products at an airbase of that size (approximately 10 km^2) without specific information as to where to collect samples.

26. During a briefing given by the Syrian Arab Republic to the Mechanism in Damascus, a representative of the Syrian Arab Air Force stated that no aircraft of the Air Force had attacked Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. This contradicted the public statement made by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic (see para. 5 above). The Mechanism also interviewed the Commander of Sha'irat airbase, who stated that no aircraft from the airbase had attacked Khan Shaykhun on 4 April.

27. At the request of the Mechanism, the Syrian Arab Republic provided the exact coordinates of six locations targeted by the Syrian Arab Air Force aircraft operating from Sha'irat airbase on 4 April 2017. The coordinates were found to be similar to the description of the targets identified in the relevant logbook. While those entries include flight times that correspond to the likely timing of the sarin event at Khan Shaykhun, they refer to aerial attacks targeting unidentified non-State armed groups in the town of Tall Hawash and west of Kafr Zayta. As noted above, while the Mechanism could confirm that one of these locations had sustained damage, it could not confirm that the damage had occurred on 4 April.

28. On 7 April 2017, United States authorities publicly released a statement and a map depicting a flight path of an aircraft originating from Sha'irat airbase that allegedly had been flying over Khan Shaykhun at approximately 0637 and 0646 hours. The Mechanism had access to another aerial map depicting the path of an aircraft alleged to have been in the airspace around Khan Shaykhun between approximately 0644 and 0651 hours on 4 April 2017. The aircraft was depicted as flying in a circular loop pattern in the vicinity of Kafr Zayta and north-east of Khan Shaykhun. The map indicated that the closest to Khan Shaykhun that the aircraft had flown had been approximately 5 km away. Additional information provided to the Mechanism referred to two aircraft that had taken off from Sha'irat airbase at around the same time as indicated above, 10 minutes apart, following the same flight path. On the basis of the above, the Mechanism found that air activity had taken place around Khan Shaykhun at about the time of the sarin incident.

29. The Mechanism compared the flight times of Syrian Arab Air Force aircraft taking off from Sha'irat airbase, as provided by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, with other flight information that it had received. The Syrian and other accounts are consistent in indicating that the Syrian Arab Air Force aircraft were in the air at the relevant time. Where the accounts diverge is with respect to whether or not the aircraft flew over or in the immediate vicinity of Khan Shaykhun.

30. As noted in paragraphs 19, 23 and 28 above, the Mechanism obtained information detailing the presence of a Su-22 within 5 km of Khan Shaykhun, as well as information provided by a Su-22 pilot interviewed by the Mechanism indicating that he had been within 7 to 9 km of Khan Shaykhun at the relevant time. The Mechanism consulted with a weapons expert to ascertain the confluence of distance and altitude from which it might be possible to hit Khan Shaykhun with an aerial bomb. The expert concluded that, depending on a number of variables such as altitude, speed and the flight path taken, it would be possible for such an aerial bomb to be dropped on the town from the aforementioned distances.

31. To date, the Mechanism has found no specific information confirming whether or not a Syrian Arab Air Force Su-22 operating from Sha'irat airbase launched an aerial attack against Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017.

Ground explosion

32. The Mechanism also sought to collect information about possible activities related to the dissemination of sarin from an improvised explosive device on the ground in accordance with the second scenario. While the Mechanism found no information relating to the preparation of an explosion through such means, it noted

a witness statement that was consistent with that scenario. In an interview with the Mechanism, the witness reported waking up at approximately 0700 hours on 4 April 2017 to the sound of explosions. The witness stated that no aircraft had been flying over Khan Shaykhun at the time and that aircraft had begun to launch attacks only at around 1100 hours.

33. No witnesses reported any activities related to the placing of an explosive charge on the ground at the location of the incident.

34. The Syrian Arab Republic provided information to the Mechanism suggesting that the release of sarin had been associated with an above-ground explosion, using an explosive charge that did not exceed 10 kg and that had been placed on the ground with a 25-litre container full of sarin. This is examined in further detail in the sections below.

Bombing of a house taken over by a non-State armed group

35. In connection with the third scenario, witness statements refer to reports of a house in Khan Shaykhun being taken over by a non-State armed group and used thereafter for the storage of ammunition and barrels. The Mechanism identified the location of the house, which corresponded to the second plume shown in the video filmed between 0642 and 0652 hours that morning. Analysis of satellite imagery revealed that damage caused to the roof of the house had occurred between 21 February and 6 April 2017. Original photographs provided by witnesses interviewed by the Mechanism also showed damage to the roof and front of the house. An independent expert engaged by the Mechanism found that the damage to the house was consistent with an explosion being caused by an air-delivered thermobaric bomb or fuel-air explosives. Samples taken by the Syrian Arab Republic from the site of the house at a later date were not found to contain traces of sarin or its degradation products.

36. The Mechanism has found no information indicating that sarin was released from this location on the morning of 4 April 2017. The Mechanism found no other information related to that scenario.

Bombing of a warehouse on the eastern outskirts of Khan Shaykhun

37. The Mechanism also conducted investigations with respect to the possibility that sarin may have been released following the bombing of a building on the eastern outskirts of Khan Shaykhun at around noon on 4 April 2017. The location, referred to in some public statements as a terrorist ammunition depot, appears to be a building used by the Syria Civil Defence as a medical site on the eastern outskirts of Khan Shaykhun. Apart from the fact that victims of the sarin incident earlier that morning had been treated there, the Mechanism did not link that location to the release of sarin.

Impact location

38. In accordance with the first two scenarios investigated by the Mechanism, the crater is the point of impact of either of the following: (a) an aerial bomb dropped from an airplane, thus dispersing sarin; or (b) an undefined mechanism, linked to the dispersion of sarin, that exploded on the surface of the road.

39. The impact location was determined to be the site identified by the Fact-Finding Mission as being to the west of grain silos in the northern part of Khan Shaykhun. Samples taken from the crater and its surroundings were found by the Fact-Finding Mission to contain sarin.

40. The Mechanism collected multiple photographs and videos of the crater from witnesses and open sources, as well as satellite imagery from a provider contracted by the Mechanism. Using those materials, forensic institutes engaged by the Mechanism determined that the crater is located at approximately 35°26′59.75″N, 36°38′55.91″E.

41. In order to identify other points of impact possibly associated with the release of sarin, the Mechanism commissioned the forensic analysis of video footage taken between 0642 and 0652 hours on 4 April that showed four plumes across Khan Shaykhun, three of which had been located approximately 320 m south-west of the crater and the fourth approximately 1.3 km south-south-west of the crater, one of which had been shorter and whiter than the others. None of the locations from which the plumes had emanated could be associated with the location of the crater.

42. Expert analysis of satellite imagery available to the Mechanism that had been taken of Khan Shaykhun on 21 February 2017 and 6 April 2017 was carried out to identify signs of damaged structures and craters in the area correlating to the locations of the plumes. The Mechanism found that at least three of those locations were buildings that appeared to have been damaged by a thermobaric bomb or fuel-air explosives. Damage to a building was observed in the general vicinity of the shorter plume, which appeared to have been created between the aforementioned dates. Therefore, the Mechanism could not conclusively determine that the building had been bombed on 4 April 2017.

43. The cause of the plume that was shorter and whiter in appearance than the other three could not be conclusively identified by munitions experts engaged by the Mechanism. Two experts noted that the plume had probably consisted of aerosolized droplets of liquid. One explained that the plume's appearance might indicate the use of a vacuum bomb that had possibly failed to explode, with the plume being a cloud of explosive liquid that had disseminated from the munition.

44. Although the plumes cannot be associated with the crater, they indicate that an aerial attack occurred in Khan Shaykhun on the morning of 4 April 2017.

Crater analysis

45. As the site where the sarin was released on the morning of 4 April 2017 was of particular importance to the investigation, the Mechanism undertook extensive efforts to collect photographs and videos of the location and to obtain expert analysis of its characteristics from several independent sources.

46. Original video footage and photographs of the impact location taken early in the morning on 4 April 2017 by a witness interviewed by the Mechanism, which were determined by a forensic institute to have been recorded between 0804 and 0917 hours, showed the crater and a deformed piece of metal protruding from it. The crater was estimated by forensic experts to have a diameter of approximately 1.5 to 1.65 m and a depth of between 42 and 51 cm. The videos and photographs showed the crater to contain debris of rock and asphalt, fragments of metal and a circular metal object that appeared to be a munition filler cap. Remnants of green paint were observed on both the deformed piece of metal and the filler cap.

47. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic provided the Mechanism with a report setting forth a series of observations about the crater. In the report, the Government concluded that the shape and characteristics of the crater and the lack of physical evidence did not indicate that it had been the result of an air strike. It was noted that the shape, depth and contents of the crater were not consistent with the effects of an aerial bomb, but rather indicated that it had been the result of a ground explosion produced using a device weighing no more than 10 kg. In support

of its position, the Government referred to the incompleteness of the debris of the alleged explosion and the absence of any residues of the bomb or rocket, including a rocket motor, tail or fins. It was also stated that three pieces from an unknown source had been deliberately placed, including the remnants of an alleged shell. The Government stated that that confirmed that the scene had been fabricated to suggest that the crater had resulted from the explosion of an aerial bomb. It was also noted in the report that the crater and its surroundings had contained traces of live agent (sarin) and its degradation products, which had been found 10 days after the alleged attack, indicating that the explosion had not led to the dispersion of the full contents of the sarin container, and that the explosion had not been well calculated.

48. The Mechanism obtained expert analysis of the characteristics of the crater from three independent, internationally recognized institutes with specialization in the areas of forensics, defence and security, as well as by two individual independent experts in energetic materials.

49. A defence research institute with expertise in high explosives and related materials noted that the site appeared to have been disturbed after impact. Nevertheless, it found indications that the ground had been hit by a substantially heavy object that had travelled at high velocity. While it could not rule out the idea that the crater had been caused by other means, it stated that indications of the detonation of a high explosive on the ground were not visible.

50. Another specialist forensic institute examined photographs and videos of the crater. In considering what had caused the crater, the institute stated that the damage was consistent with that of an impact from an unguided aerial bomb, possibly containing a small bursting charge. It explained that that conclusion was based on the evidence showing that there had been very little damage around the crater caused by fragmentation of the munition casing and no significant damage to structures near the crater due to blast overpressure. The institute also observed that the use of a ground-launched munition was unlikely, as no remnants peculiar to a rocket had been evident in the crater or found in its vicinity.

51. One of the individual experts noted that the impact location was a section of paved road very close to which a metal cabinet was situated. As no significant impacts or holes were visible in the plates of the metal cabinet, the impact was consistent with that of a liquid-filled bomb that had a thin shell and contained a very limited amount of explosive in its bursting charge. The expert found that the appearance of the crater indicated that the pavement had been hit by a relatively large object at high velocity, without a large amount of explosives being involved.

52. With regard to the suggestion that the crater might have been caused by an explosive charge placed on the ground, the expert noted that that was contradicted by the following: (a) the appearance of the edges of the surrounding pavement, where little fragmentation was seen; (b) the absence of an elevated rim around the crater; (c) the relatively few cracks in the pavement around the crater; and (d) the existence of objects buried deep in the crater. The expert also dismissed the suggestion that the crater might have been created by excavation and the emplacement of the objects found therein, on account of the following: (a) the jagged appearance of the edges; (b) the radial cracks formed in the pavement; (c) the depth at which the objects were buried in the crater; and (d) the lack of any sign of the tools used to excavate the crater, which would have left marks on its edges. The expert concluded that it was very unlikely that the crater had been caused by a ground-launched weapon, an explosive charge or a liquid-filled warhead emplaced on the ground, or excavation and the emplacement of the objects found therein.

53. The expert examined the dimensions and shape of the crater and analysed whether it was consistent with the use of various types of bombs and rockets. The expert concluded that the type of munition most likely to have caused the crater was a relatively large bomb with a mass of 300 to 450 kg. The shape of the crater, which was relatively circular, indicated that the bomb had been dropped from a medium or high altitude, of between approximately 4,000 and 10,000 m.

54. The experts agreed that the crater was unlikely to have been caused by high explosives, as there were too few visible signs of damage caused by fragmentation or overpressure, especially on the metal cabinet located 3 to 5 m away from the crater. The expert analysis found that the characteristics of the crater were consistent with the impact of a heavy object travelling at high velocity, probably with a liquid fill. Any explosion from the bursting charge would be small and, furthermore, the liquid surrounding the bursting charge would have absorbed most of the energy from the explosion. The Mechanism notes that, on the basis of the foregoing, the characteristics of the crater are more likely to have been caused by an aerial bomb with a small explosive charge, and that it probably contained liquid.

Munition analysis

55. As described in paragraph 46 above, two objects of interest that were visible in photographs and videos of the crater were analysed by the Mechanism. These were the filler cap from a chemical munition and a deformed piece of metal protruding from deep within the crater.

56. According to information obtained by the Mechanism, the filler cap, with two closure plugs, is uniquely consistent with Syrian chemical aerial bombs. The Mechanism was provided with an assessment of the filler cap and with chemical analysis showing sarin and a reaction product of sarin with hexamine that can be formed only under very high heat. Information was also received that additional metal fragments collected from the crater might correspond to parts of Syrian aerial chemical munitions.

57. The two energetic-materials experts engaged by the Mechanism reported that the size and thickness of the metal piece protruding from the crater indicated that it had been the casing of an aerial bomb measuring between 300 and 500 mm in diameter.

58. The munition remnants recovered from the crater by unidentified individuals are assessed as being associated with an air-delivered chemical bomb. Specific munition remnants, particularly the tailfin, could not be recovered. The absence of a chain of custody relating to the munition remnants diminishes their probative value.

59. The Syrian Arab Republic provided information to the Mechanism suggesting that the release of sarin had been associated with an above-ground explosion, which is reflected in the second scenario examined by the Mechanism. According to the government report, the point of impact had been the result of a ground explosion using an explosive charge that did not exceed 10 kg of trinitrotoluene (TNT) and that had been placed on the ground with a 25-litre container full of sarin. The Government also noted that the fact that the crater and its surroundings had contained traces of sarin and its degradation products 10 days after the incident proved that the explosion had not dispersed all the sarin in the container, which meant that the explosion had not been well calculated.

60. The Mechanism also requested the two individual experts, forensic institutes and defence institutes to examine whether an explosive device placed on the ground could have caused the crater. The forensic institutes and the experts in energetic materials ruled out the idea that an improvised explosive device placed underground

would have created such a crater. This was based on the characteristics of the crater and the lack of substantial cracks and radial detonation marks of blast products on the surface surrounding it.

61. With respect to whether such a device might have been placed on the surface of the road, they determined that it would have needed to contain an equivalent of 10 kg of TNT or 12 kg of ammonium nitrate fuel oil. The experts generally ruled out that possibility, because such an explosion would have caused much more damage to the surroundings than what had been observed. The two experts in energetic materials also noted that the metal object protruding from the crater was too large and too deeply embedded for the improvised explosive device scenario to be likely.

62. Further to the statements of witnesses that they saw and heard aircraft, the observations with potentially the most probative value, namely, those of the forensic institutes and individual experts, indicate that the crater was most likely caused by an unguided air-delivered bomb.

63. On the basis of the lack of characteristics that would be expected following an explosion produced by an explosive charge placed on the ground, the Mechanism notes that the munition used would more likely have been an aerial bomb.

Dispersion of sarin

64. Sarin of an undefined purity was disseminated from the crater in a direction that was defined by local air movements. The Mechanism noted that the wind speed in the area that day had been <0.5 m/s, which would normally result in a considerable variation in the direction of the air movement. The Mechanism also noted that the location of victims, as described in the report of the Fact-Finding Mission, serves as an indicator of prevailing air movements west to south-west of the location of the crater during the early morning on 4 April 2017.

65. A defence research institute with expertise in dispersion modelling was commissioned by the Mechanism to determine the likely amount of sarin released and its impact on the number of victims poisoned. In conducting the modelling, the defence research institute took into account certain factors specific to Khan Shaykhun, such as its population and local weather conditions.

66. While no firm conclusion as to the amount of sarin used in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017 could be established, the institute noted that, if the same quantity of sarin were used, an aerial bomb would be expected to deposit smaller amounts of sarin on the ground than an explosive charge placed directly on the ground.

67. The observation made by the Syrian Arabic Republic that traces of live agent (sarin) could be observed, 10 days after the incident, in the crater area and the area near the silos 80 m to the east of the crater may be explained by the amount of sarin deposited on the ground at the time of its release. The Mechanism therefore compared the amounts of sarin that would be deposited on the ground by the following: (a) a chemical aerial bomb; and (b) an improvised explosive device for dispersion. A chemical aerial bomb releasing 150 to 250 litres of sarin and depositing 10 to 15 per cent of its contents on the ground would deposit more sarin on the ground than an improvised explosive device containing 25 litres of sarin. The Mechanism notes that, in either case, sarin would have been dispersed into the general environment, as has been confirmed by the analysis of environmental samples.

68. The above analysis supports the scenario of an aerial bomb depositing a larger amount of sarin on or into the ground than would be deposited by an improvised explosive device containing 25 litres of sarin.

Medical effects and response

69. While noting the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission, the Mechanism collected and reviewed information from a range of sources concerning the medical effects on and treatment administered to persons in Khan Shaykhun following the incident, including open sources, interviews with victims and medical personnel, and a review of medical records. The Mechanism collected and analysed that information to determine the impact of the incident on the community, in particular its emergency response and health-care sector.

70. In reports from open sources in the immediate aftermath of the incident, it was noted that victims in Khan Shaykhun appeared to show symptoms consistent with exposure to organophosphorus chemicals also expressed as a neurotoxic agent. In addition, open sources reported that chlorine might also have been released, as indicated by the smell of bleach. While the Mechanism could not rule out the possibility of the use of chlorine, it focused its investigative efforts on the use of sarin.

71. On the basis of medical records and witness statements, the Fact-Finding Mission identified approximately 100 fatalities and at least 200 other casualties who had survived acute exposure. Such an event in a town the size of Khan Shaykhun would constitute quite a challenge for a society already in distress. There are four critical immediate recourses that should be available in a mass-casualty incident involving sarin poisoning: (a) adequate decontamination to stop exposure and protect rescue and health-care staff from secondary contamination; (b) assisted ventilation, either mechanical or manual, after intubation; (c) sufficient administration of the primary antidotes atropine and pralidoxime; and (d) ample capacity for the transport of patients so that their needs can be met.

72. The Mechanism ascertained that more than 10 health-care facilities in Khan Shaykhun, Idlib Governorate and a neighbouring country had become involved in providing health care to those affected by the incident. According to reports, doctors were struggling amid extreme shortages, including of the antidotes used to save patients. There were also reports that most of the fatalities had died before they had reached the hospitals.

73. The Mechanism found that the reported symptoms of the victims were consistent with exposure to sarin and that the available information on the medical impact of the attack on 4 April 2017, including the response of the health-care sector, consistently pointed to the use of sarin.

74. On the basis of its review of open-source material showing first responders in the hours immediately after the incident, the Mechanism observed several methods and procedures that appeared to be either unusual or inappropriate in the circumstances. In particular, the Mechanism noted that fully equipped hazmat teams had appeared at the scene later that afternoon and reported early detection of the presence of sarin, apparently using a Dräger X-am 7000 ambient air monitor, which was not known to be able to detect sarin. Of additional concern to the Mechanism was the relatively unprofessional manner in which certain environmental samples appear to have been taken, for example, sampling from a muddy puddle.

75. The Mechanism also noted scenes recorded just after the incident at the medical site to the east of Khan Shaykhun, where rescue and decontamination activities filmed shortly after 0700 hours showed rescue personnel indiscriminately hosing down patients with water for extended periods of time. That video footage also showed a number of patients not being attended to, as well as paramedical interventions that did not seem to make medical sense, such as performing cardiac compression on a patient who was lying face down.

76. The Mechanism was provided with expert analysis regarding the medical symptoms and responses indicated in witness statements and medical records, as well as the treatment received at a range of health-care facilities, including those in a neighbouring country.

77. Certain irregularities were observed in elements of the information analysed. For example, several hospitals appeared to have begun admitting casualties of the attack between 0640 and 0645 hours. The Mechanism received the medical records of 247 patients from Khan Shaykhun who had been admitted to various health-care facilities, including survivors and a number of victims who eventually died from exposure to a chemical agent. The admission times noted in the records range from 0600 to 1600 hours. Analysis of the records revealed that in 57 cases, patients had been admitted to five hospitals before the incident (at 0600, 0620 and 0640 hours). In 10 of those cases, patients appear to have been admitted to a hospital 125 km away from Khan Shaykhun at 0700 hours, while another 42 patients appear to have been admitted to a hospital 30 km away at 0700 hours. The Mechanism did not investigate those discrepancies and cannot determine whether they are linked to any possible staging scenario or are the result of poor record-keeping in chaotic conditions.

78. An inconsistency was identified in one of the Fact-Finding Mission's biomedical results from samples lacking a chain of custody. In sample No. 13,[1] the blood sample tested negative for sarin or a sarin-like substance, while the urine sample tested positive for the sarin degradation product isopropyl methylphosphonate. There is currently no explanation for the inconsistency. Medical experts consulted by the Mechanism indicated that the combination of the negative result in the blood and the positive result in the urine was impossible. That inconsistency was considered to be most likely the result of cross-contamination in the sampling process.

79. The Mechanism observed from open sources that the treatment administered to victims from Khan Shaykhun had frequently involved oxygen and cortisone therapy. Such treatment is not recommended for sarin poisoning, but is recommended mainly for lung damage, as would be caused by either chlorine or vacuum bombs.

80. On the basis of its consultations with two medical experts, the Mechanism found that the response carried out by rescue workers and medical personnel in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017 had been essentially consistent with the use of sarin on such a scale. While some potentially important irregularities were identified throughout the rescue operation and in medical records, they may be explained by such factors as poor training, the chaotic conditions or attempts to inflate the gravity of the situation for depiction in the media.

Chemistry

81. In order to ascertain the origin of the sarin dispersed in Khan Shaykhun, the Mechanism took steps to identify its components and its possible production methods, including by commissioning studies at an OPCW-designated laboratory.

82. In the course of synthesizing a chemical, not only the desired chemical, but also certain by-products, are formed. If the production of a chemical requires several reaction steps, such by-products are also carried forward as impurities to the next step of the synthesis. Furthermore, impurities may undergo chemical transformation themselves, thus forming new and different impurities. Therefore, the method used for the production of a chemical may be ascertained by identifying the impurities that it contains. Impurities in samples may also link a sample to its

[1] See S/2017/567, table 4.

starting material (precursor) should the impurities in the sample and the precursor match.

83. During the removal of the stockpile belonging to the Syrian Arab Republic in 2014, OPCW collected samples from the sarin precursor methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF) before the rest of the stockpile was destroyed. The Mechanism commissioned a laboratory to study and compare the impurities, and their formation, in samples of stockpiled DF. Five different samples from the country's DF stockpile were analysed for impurities.

84. Environmental samples were collected in Khan Shaykhun both from inside the crater and from its surroundings. The results of the analysis carried out by OPCW-designated laboratories confirm the presence of sarin and some of its known degradation products.[2] Moreover, the results confirm that sarin was produced by the binary route, in which DF is combined with isopropanol (iPrOH) in the presence of hexamine.

85. The five DF samples from the Syrian Arab Republic stockpile and the environmental samples from Khan Shaykhun all contained the impurity phosphorus hexafluoride (PF6). The Mechanism studied the significance of PF6 as a "marker chemical" for DF produced by the Syrian Arab Republic. The study tested the conditions for the formation of PF6 in the production of DF, as well as the possibility of its removal from DF. Laboratory experiments showed that PF6 is formed when hydrogen fluoride (HF) is used as a fluorinating agent in the production of DF. If a different commonly used fluorinating agent is used, no PF6 is formed. PF6 is also not formed in such DF as a result of long-term storage. Furthermore, the test showed that PF6 cannot be removed through distillation.

86. Two of the five samples from the Syrian Arab Republic DF stockpile contained the impurity phosphorous oxychloride (POCl3). The environmental samples from Khan Shaykhun had two additional types of marker chemicals: isopropyl phosphates and isopropyl phosphorofluoridates. Laboratory tests show that such marker chemicals are formed if DF from the Syrian Arab Republic stockpile containing POCl3 is used to make binary sarin.

87. On the basis of the foregoing, the Mechanism concludes that the presence of the marker chemical PF6 is evidence that HF was used to produce the DF that was the precursor for the sarin released in Khan Shaykhun. HF is a very aggressive and dangerous gas and therefore is difficult to handle. The use of HF indicates a high degree of competence and sophistication in the production of DF and points to a chemical-plant-type production method.

88. The samples from Khan Shaykhun contain the three types of marker chemicals described above: PF6, isopropyl phosphates and isopropyl phosphorofluoridates. Their presence is a strong indicator that the sarin disseminated in Khan Shaykhun was produced from DF from the Syrian Arab Republic stockpile.

89. An initial screening of the reports concerning previous incidents of the release of sarin in the Syrian Arab Republic showed that some marker chemicals appeared to be present in environmental samples. This would warrant further study.

90. The presence of marker chemicals that are believed to be unique is a strong indication that the sarin released in Khan Shaykhun, as well as in previous incidents, was produced using DF from the Syrian Arab Republic stockpile.

91. In the light of the marker chemicals identified in the DF and the sarin, which are believed to be unique, the Mechanism concludes that the precursor chemical DF,

[2] See S/2017/756, S/2017/567 and S/2017/440.

which is necessary for the production of binary sarin, is very likely to have originated from the Syrian Arab Republic. This finding relates only to the origin of the DF used as a precursor, not to those responsible for the dissemination of sarin.

III. Assessment and findings by the Leadership Panel

92. In order to determine to the greatest extent feasible those who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017, the Leadership Panel requested that the investigators examine eight possible scenarios regarding how the events had unfolded. Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the prevailing scenario that emerged was that sarin had been delivered through an aerial bomb dropped by an airplane. Most of the information collected and analysed by the Mechanism supports that scenario.

93. With respect to identifying those responsible, the Leadership Panel has determined that the information that it has obtained constitutes sufficient credible and reliable evidence of the following:

(a) Aircraft dropped munitions over Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017;

(b) An aircraft of the Syrian Arab Republic was in the immediate vicinity of Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017;

(c) The crater from which the sarin emanated was created on the morning of 4 April 2017;

(d) The crater was caused by the impact of an aerial bomb travelling at high velocity;

(e) A large number of people were affected by sarin between 0630 and 0700 hours on the morning of 4 April 2017;

(f) The number of persons affected by the release of sarin on 4 April 2017, and the fact that sarin reportedly continued to be present at the site of the crater 10 days after the incident, indicate that a large amount of sarin was likely released, which is consistent with its being dispersed through a chemical aerial bomb;

(g) The symptoms of the victims and their medical treatment, as well as the scale of the incident, are consistent with large-scale sarin poisoning;

(h) The sarin identified in the samples taken from Khan Shaykhun was found to have most likely been made with a precursor (DF) from the original stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic;

(i) The irregularities described in the present annex are not of such a nature as to call into question the aforementioned findings.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Leadership Panel is confident that the Syrian Arab Republic is responsible for the release of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. The findings of the Leadership Panel regarding the evidence in this case are based on the information set forth in detail in the present annex.

United Nations S/2017/935

Security Council

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Letter dated 25 October 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you a note by the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) covering the actions and decisions taken in relation to the work of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (see annex).

I would be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Antonio **Guterres**

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Annex

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Please find attached a note by the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that covers the actions and decisions taken in relation to the work of the fact-finding mission (see enclosure). A number of comments and questions have recently been raised on the work of the fact-finding mission and the decision not to deploy the mission to Khan Shaykhun. I believe it is important that OPCW provide the present note to assist in clarifying the situation.

I have circulated the present note to all States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

(*Signed*) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Note by the Technical Secretariat

Further clarifications of why the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons fact-finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic did not deploy to Khan Shaykhun

1. The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), in its "Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding an Alleged Incident in Khan Shaykhun, Syrian Arab Republic, April 2017" (S/1510/2017, dated 29 June 2017) (hereinafter "the FFM Report"), concluded that, while the conditions of a safe visit to Khan Shaykhun were not met, a large number of people, some of whom died, were exposed to sarin, and that the release that caused the exposure was likely initiated in the vicinity of a crater in the road, located close to the silos in the northern part of the town. The FFM further concluded that such a release can only be determined as the use of the Schedule 1(A) chemical sarin as a chemical weapon.[1]

2. The Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") recalls that the FFM was set up in May 2014 to "establish the facts surrounding allegations of the use of toxic chemicals, reportedly chlorine, for hostile purposes in the Syrian Arab Republic" on the basis of the OPCW Director-General's authority under the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Convention") to seek to uphold at all times the object and purpose of the Convention, as reinforced by the relevant decisions of the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") and the United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2118 (2013).

3. The Terms of Reference of the FFM[2] were mutually agreed upon by the OPCW and the Syrian Arab Republic through the exchange of letters between the Director General and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, dated 1 and 10 May 2014.

4. The continuation of the FFM was endorsed by the Council in decision EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015, as recalled by UNSCR 2209 (2015), and subsequently, decision EC-M-50/DEC.1, dated 23 November 2015. Both of these Council decisions and UNSCR 2209 (2015) require the FFM to study all available information relating to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, including that provided by the Syrian Arab Republic as well as by others.

5. The FFM is also referred to in UNSCR 2235 (2015) which established the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism "[t]o identify to the greatest extent feasible individuals, entities, groups, or governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic where the OPCW FFM determines or has determined that a specific incident in the Syrian Arab Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical".[3]

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[1] Paragraph 6.25 of S/1510/2017.

[2] Annex to the Note by the Secretariat S/1255/2015*, dated 10 March 2015 and Add.1, dated 13 March 2015.

[3] Operative paragraph 5 of UNSCR 2235 (2015).

6. The scope of the FFM's mandate does not include the task of attributing responsibility for the alleged use.[4] The FFM's investigation of the incident in Khan Shaykhun of 4 April 2017 was conducted within the legal framework described above.

7. The Secretariat underscores that, consistent with the approach taken during its previous investigations, the FFM applied established methodology and procedures to the investigation of the incident. The methodology is illustrated in detail in Section 3 of the FFM Report. One of the three underlying principles of the FFM's methodology is ensuring the implementation of appropriate chain of custody procedures for evidence collection. The FFM upheld this principle by adhering to the most stringent OPCW guidelines and procedures, including those regarding chain of custody, for the conduct of an investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons, as applicable, and as listed in Annex 1 to the FFM Report, from the time of collection or receipt of evidence, including samples, by the FFM.

8. When the FFM was constrained in the collection of evidence, due to its inability to access the site of the incident shortly after it occurred, the FFM requested that the evidence provided by other parties be supported to the extent possible by documents, photographs, video footage, or witness testimony. The FFM analysed and weighed this evidence, taking into account the degree of separation in the chain of custody between the source and the point of receipt by the FFM and the corroboration provided by the party submitting such evidence.

9. It is the combination, the consistency and corroboration of the evidence gathered as a whole, including the evidence provided by the Syrian Arab Republic, rather than individual items of evidence taken in isolation, which formed the basis of the conclusions of the FFM Report on the Khan Shaykhun incident. The Secretariat further recalls that the biomedical samples of which the FFM had full custody provided incontrovertible evidence that certain individuals were exposed to sarin or a sarin-like substance.

10. Regarding the question of a visit of the FFM to the alleged site of the incident in Khan Shaykhun, as noted in the FFM Report, this area is located outside of the effective control of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic.[5] Therefore, and upon request of the Secretariat, a negotiator from the Office of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General to Syria was made available to the FFM. He communicated with a number of relevant individuals and groups in regard to the safe passage of the FFM to this site. During the later stages of these communications, the FFM visited Damascus and was prepared to deploy to Khan Shaykhun if there had been compelling reasons to do so.

11. However, the formal process to seek security clearance from the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) was never initiated. The initiation of this process would have occurred if it had been decided that there was insufficient evidence obtained by the FFM to fulfil its mandate to determine whether a chemical had been used as a weapon. In this regard, as noted by the OPCW Director-General in his statement to the Council at its Fifty-Fifth Meeting of 5 July 2017, once the positive determination was made by the FFM, based on all the evidence collected, including the samples provided by the Syrian Arab Republic, that sarin had been used for hostile purposes on 4 April 2017, there was no compelling reason which would justify a site visit. In particular, since the mandate of the FFM is confined to determining the use of chemical weapons, the security

[4] Fifth preambular paragraph of EC-M-48/DEC.1; sixth preambular paragraph of EC-M-50/DEC.1; and eighth preambular paragraph of UNSCR 2235 (2015).

[5] Paragraph 7 of S/1510/2017.

risks associated with a deployment to Khan Shaykhun far outweighed any additional corroboration of the facts that had already been established based on a variety of evidence, including that provided by the Syrian Arab Republic. The Director-General therefore decided that the FFM would not undertake an on-site visit to Khan Shaykhun and the formal request for obtaining security clearance from UNDSS was not submitted.[6]

12. Concerning the possibility of a visit of FFM to the Al-Shayrat airbase, the Secretariat reiterates its view that the FFM lacked the mandate and the authority to conduct an investigation at this site. A determination of the point of origin of a possible chemical attack in Khan Shaykhun would have gone beyond the mandate of the FFM, which was limited to establishing the fact whether a chemical had been used as a weapon. This fact was ascertained, in the conclusions of the FFM's report based on sufficient and incontrovertible evidence.

13. Finally, the FFM concluded that the release of sarin that caused the exposure was likely to have been initiated in the vicinity of a crater in the road in the northern part of the town of Khan Shaykhun. As noted in the FFM Report, the FFM received limited information on the dispersal mechanism and therefore was unable to make firm conclusions on that specific matter.[7] Notwithstanding, the FFM fulfilled its mandate, by establishing in a professional and impartial manner that sarin was used as a weapon in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017.

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[6] In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding between the OPCW and the UNDSS, dated 24 August 2011, the OPCW must fully comply with the instructions of the Designated Officer of UNDSS at the duty station regarding security matters.

[7] Paragraph 1.6 of S/1510/2017.

United Nations S/2017/906

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 November 2017
English
Original: French

Letter dated 25 October 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the status of the implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya (see annex). The report, dated 23 October 2017, covers the period from 23 September to 22 October 2017.

The report was prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-52/DEC.1 of 20 July 2016 and Security Council resolution 2298 (2016) of 22 July 2016, for transmission to the Security Council.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

17-19329 (E) 031117 031117

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Annex

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled "Status of the implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya", prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-52/DEC.1, dated 20 July 2016, and Security Council resolution 2298 (2016), dated 22 July 2016, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 23 September to 22 October 2017 and also covers the reporting requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-52/DEC.2, dated 27 July 2016 and EC-M-53/DEC.1, dated 26 August 2016.

(*Signed*) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Report of the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Status of the implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya

1. At its Fifty-Second Meeting, the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") adopted a decision on the "Destruction of Libya's Remaining Chemical Weapons" (EC-M-52/DEC.1, dated 20 July 2016) and requested the Director-General to assist Libya in developing a modified plan of destruction of Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons. On 22 July 2016, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2298 (2016), welcoming and endorsing the decision by the Council and requesting the Director-General, through the Secretary-General, to report to the Security Council on a regular basis until the destruction is complete and verified.

2. At the conclusion of its Fifty-Second Meeting, the Council adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Libya's Remaining Category 2 Chemical Weapons" (EC-M-52/DEC.2, dated 27 July 2016). In operative paragraph 17 of that decision, the Council requested the Director-General to report to the Council on a monthly basis on the implementation of the decision. This fourteenth monthly report covers the period from 23 September to 22 October 2017.

Progress in the elimination of Libyan chemical weapons by the State Party hosting destruction activities

3. Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung von chemischen Kampfstoffen und Rüstungsaltlasten mbH (GEKA mbH), the designated destruction facility at Munster, Germany, completed the destruction of the 2-chloroethanol and tributylamine on 17 December 2016 and 20 January 2017, respectively. The destruction of thionyl chloride was completed on 10 September 2017.

4. As previously reported (EC-85/DG.1, dated 23 March 2017), the destruction of phosphorous trichloride by incineration was suspended as a necessary precaution in order to prevent the refractory coating from severe damage. Destruction by neutralisation began on 12 September 2017. As at 16 October, 48.3 metric tonnes (MT), or 42.5%, of the phosphorous trichloride had been destroyed.

5. Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") teams, along with Libyan observers, continue to inspect GEKA mbH every two months, with the last such inspection having been conducted from 12 to 15 September 2017. No issues were encountered with the destruction process.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to Libya

6. The Secretariat inspected the destruction operations at GEKA mbH and reviewed the neutralisation of phosphorous trichloride during the aforementioned inspection. The Secretariat was able to witness sampling and analysis of the reaction mass in order to confirm completion of destruction. The inspection team verified the completion of the destruction of thionyl chloride and the ongoing destruction of phosphorous trichloride through on-site confirmation and review of video recordings.

7. The next inspection at GEKA mbH is scheduled to take place from 4 to 7 December 2017. The Secretariat will continue to assess the verification procedures for the neutralisation process and confirm the destruction since the last inspection.

8. GEKA mbH is closely monitoring the destruction of the Libyan Category 2 chemical weapons. To ensure that destruction occurs in the shortest time possible, while making certain that no damage occurs to the incinerator, GEKA mbH will run small quantities of phosphorous trichloride through the incinerator, as well as the neutralisation system.

9. As previously reported, the Secretariat was informed that during decanting operations at the Ruwagha storage facility, one container experienced an exothermic reaction, causing the material inside to polymerise. Through an agreement with the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS), destruction of the contents of the remaining container began on 25 July and was completed on 7 August 2017. The Secretariat has confirmed the destruction of the contents of the container.

10. On 29 August 2017, the Secretariat received a letter from His Excellency Mr Mohamed Siala, the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, noting the approaching completion of its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and inviting the Secretariat to send an inspection team to Libya. On 19 September 2017, the Director-General informed Minister Siala that the Secretariat was in touch with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security regarding updates to the security situation in Libya. Further to this point, the Director-General noted that the Secretariat is working closely with the Libyan National Authority to develop a plan that would allow the Secretariat to comply with the report of the Council at its Eighty-Third Session (paragraph 6.12 of EC-83/5, dated 11 November 2016), requesting soil samples from Ruwagha.

11. On 20 September 2017, the Director-General wrote to the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, requesting an assessment of the feasibility of an inspection team traveling to Ruwagha. For further consideration, on 20 September 2017, the Director-General transmitted a letter to the Special Representative of the Secretary–General and the head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Mr Ghassan Salamé, informing him of the correspondence from the Libyan Foreign Minister and seeking assistance from UNSMIL in the event of a mission to Ruwagha.

12. On 17 October, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security replied to the Director-General, noting that the Ruwagha chemical facility is located in the central province of Al-Jufra, which is currently under the control of the Libyan National Army. A "no-fly zone" has been imposed over this region and the United Nations has not been able to obtain clearance for a flight into the area in the last 18 months. The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security recommended that the OPCW first conduct an assessment visit to Tripoli, in order to discuss access to the Ruwagha facility with the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, security authorities, and UNSMIL. This visit to Tripoli is being prepared.

Overall costs and status of the trust fund

13. On 1 August 2016, the Secretariat issued a Note calling for voluntary contributions to the trust fund for support to Libya (S/1400/2016, dated 1 August 2016). As at the cut-off date of this report, the trust fund had received over EUR 1.2 million, with contributions having been received from Canada, Cyprus, Finland, New Zealand, and the United States of America. An additional EUR 133,638 was received from Canada in the form of a transfer of funds from a previous trust fund

dedicated to Libya. Furthermore, the Secretariat received a contribution of EUR 20,000 from Spain on 30 June 2017. As at the cut-off date of this report, expenses in the amount of EUR 816,946 had been charged to the trust fund for activities related to the destruction of Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons.

14. The trust fund continues to be used to fund destruction and verification activities related to Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons. The content of the remaining Category 2 chemical weapons container in Ruwagha was destroyed utilising funding from Cyprus, Finland, New Zealand, and Spain.

15. The Secretariat has been notified that the European Union will provide substantial funding for the clean-up operations of the Ruwagha Tank Farm, where 350 MT of highly acidic mustard hydrolysate is stored in corroded and leaking containers, along with other remnants from the former chemical weapons programme.

16. The Director-General would once again like to express his appreciation to those States Parties that have already made or have committed to making voluntary contributions to the trust fund.

United Nations S/2017/907

Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2363 (2017), by which the Council extended the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 30 June 2018 and requested me to report, every 60 days, on its implementation. The report provides an update on and analysis of the conflict, the political situation and the operational environment in Darfur and the main challenges to the effective implementation of the mandate, including violations of the status-of-forces agreement, for the period from 15 August until 15 October 2017. It also presents the steps taken by UNAMID towards achieving its benchmarks and provides an update on progress in the implementation of the recommendations contained in the special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of UNAMID (S/2017/437).

II. Conflict analysis

2. While there were no open confrontations between the forces of the Government of the Sudan and Darfur armed groups during the period under review, the arms collection campaign launched by the Government brought to the fore tensions involving the tribal militias formerly allied with the Government, and resulted in shifting alliances among various groups. Meanwhile, intercommunal clashes and hostilities continued, many of them attributable to unresolved disputes over land management and ownership, notwithstanding the reconciliation efforts led by local authorities with the support of UNAMID and the United Nations country team. The implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, aimed at addressing such outstanding issues, remained slow, constrained by the lack of presence, capacity and resources on the ground of the remaining commissions and fund of the Doha Document. No large-scale return of internally displaced persons took place, and the overall humanitarian situation remained unchanged, with no significant displacements reported.

Emerging tensions in the context of the disarmament campaign

3. No confrontation between the Government and the Darfur rebel groups was reported. On 8 October, the Government extended the unilateral ceasefire until the end of December. Meanwhile, the non-signatories of the Doha Document for Peace

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in Darfur and their former foes, namely, the tribal militias that had supported counter-insurgency operations, joined together in opposition to the arms collection campaign launched by the Government in August. Musa Hilal, a northern Rizeigat with strong influence over the border guards, categorically denounced the campaign and the plan to incorporate the border guards into the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). On 9 August, the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) indicated that the armed movements in Darfur would not hand over their weapons, unless comprehensive security sector reform was undertaken. On 19 August, the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) welcomed the position of Musa Hilal and offered to work with him in rejecting the process. On 24 August, Gibril Ibrahim, the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), called for the process to be put on hold until a comprehensive peace agreement was reached. Other forces previously allied with the Government, including two Arab militias of the Korgibba and Savana tribes, declared their support for Musa Hilal on 19 August, and 76 military officers of the 20th Division of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in East Darfur State, along with some RSF elements, reportedly joined Hilal on 20 August. In addition, Nour al Din Zurg, the leader of the Sudan Liberation Army/Zurg faction, who had signed a peace agreement with the Government in 2015, joined Hilal on 22 August.

4. The disarmament campaign has to date generated different reactions across the Darfur states. While no incidents were reported in South Darfur State, the impounding of unregistered vehicles in West Darfur State led to the killing of one soldier from SAF in Murnei and injury to an Arab Awlad Janoub in Al Salam by the Sudanese Police Force on 12 September. UNAMID also received reports of the tense security situation in Murnei, West Darfur, due to the refusal of Arab communities to cooperate in the arms collection campaign. In East Darfur, three Ma'aliya youth were arrested and imprisoned in Abu Karinka, while a group of former border guards from the Rizeigat tribe allegedly smuggled heavy weapons to North Darfur State. In North Darfur, the home of Musa Hilal, the President of the Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, reportedly instructed the Governor on 23 August to decisively handle any attempts to destabilize security. On 21 and 23 September, RSF reportedly clashed with Hilal's forces in the Bir Magi area, near the border with Libya, and in Dongola in the Northern State of the Sudan, respectively. On 12 October, the Governor of North Darfur announced the arrival of 10,000 RSF members to support the disarmament campaign, while the mobilization of RSF has also been reported near Kabkabiyah, where the Jebel Amir gold mine is located.

5. Clashes involving RSF were reported on several other occasions. On 22 August, in West Darfur, unidentified men exchanged fire with RSF in Adikong area, 26 km west of El Geneina, killing one RSF officer. RSF and Arab militias mobilized, blaming Chadian forces for the incident, and RSF elements attacked a group of Zaghawa coming from Chad and seized their vehicles. SAF and the Sudan-Chad joint forces were deployed to defuse the tensions in the area. In North Darfur, on 28 August, a group of RSF personnel killed a member of the Central Reserve Police in Maliha town, north-east of El Fasher, as a result of an altercation. In retaliation, members of the Central Reserve Police blocked access to the town, restricting all movement, and demanded that RSF surrender the perpetrators. Government authorities intervened to defuse tension.

6. The security situation in Sortony, North Darfur, remained precarious, with the continued presence of the Sudan Liberation Army/Popular Defence (SLA/PD) led by "General" Sadiq. On 3 September, a group of Arab nomads mobilized to attack the Sortony gathering site for internally displaced persons, alleging livestock theft by SLA/PD elements at the site. Sadiq denied the accusation, while announcing his refusal to join SAF on account of failures by the Government to fulfil its promises

and hinting at the possibility of rejoining SLA/AW. On 6 September, Sadiq, with 90 SLA/PD elements, moved from Sortony to Lugo, in Rockero, 65 km north-east of Nertiti, in Central Darfur State. Meanwhile, on 15 September, UNAMID received reports that SLA/PD had imposed a tax on traders inside the Sortony gathering site, which Sadiq claimed to use for the protection of internally displaced persons during the farming season and the purchase of ammunitions and uniforms for his group.

Intercommunal conflicts

7. Intercommunal conflicts continued, albeit with fewer incidents, mainly over disputes relating to farmland, grazing areas, water and livestock. Eight cases resulted in 19 fatalities, compared with the 10 clashes with 74 fatalities reported during the previous period. The reduction could be attributed to effective interventions by local authorities.

8. In Central Darfur, on 21 August, two separate incidents resulted in the deaths of a member of the Salamat tribe in Bindisi and a Fallata near Um Dukhun. Both instances were resolved through compensation agreements reached by community leaders. In North Darfur, on 11 September, Ereigat herders killed a farmer in Wadi Mondow, near Korma. Meanwhile, tensions between the Maharia northern Rizeigat and SLA/AW elements over cattle theft escalated into the abduction and killing of a SLA/AW commander in July and the abduction of a Maharia member of the border guards on 15 August, which prompted armed Maharia to threaten an attack on Nertiti market and Straha area on 21 August. In addition, two civilians were killed by nomads in the Boulay area over livestock theft, on 14 September. In South Darfur, a Fallata was killed in Tulus in an incident of cattle theft.

9. In East Darfur, following the clashes between the Ma'aliya and the Rizeigat in June and July, the Governor issued a decree on 16 August, instructing the commissioners of all localities in the state to relieve the local chiefs (*umda*) of their responsibilities for their failure to contain the conflict. Subsequently, 194 *umda* from five communities were relieved of their duties, including 105 from the Rizeigat, 45 from the Birgid, 30 from the Ma'aliya and 7 each from the Bago and Khazan Jadid native administrations. While tensions consequently subdued, there were concerns that such measures could further weaken the traditional institutions.

Violence against civilians and human rights violations

10. The overall human rights situation in Darfur remained tense and volatile, compounded by the proliferation of arms and weak law enforcement and justice institutions. As was the case in the previous reporting period, internally displaced persons and other vulnerable persons continued to face harassment, killings, looting of property, random shootings within and around their camps and general insecurity.

11. UNAMID was informed of 72 cases of human rights violations and abuses involving 253 victims, including 16 minors (15 girls and 1 boy) and 30 women, compared with 82 cases involving 124 victims, including 15 minors, during the previous reporting period. Violations of the right to life accounted for 7 cases involving 8 victims, violations of the right to physical integrity (assault) accounted for 30 cases involving 146 victims, and abductions accounted for 6 cases involving 27 victims. There were 27 cases of sexual and gender-based violence in the form of rape and attempted rape involving 31 victims, including 15 minors (all girls), and 2 cases of arbitrary arrest and illegal detention involving 41 victims. Violence against women and girls continued unabated. Challenges of restricted access to areas where incidents occurred and the non-reporting of cases by some victims of sexual violence due to stigma and limited access to justice for women, in particular in remote areas, remained.

12. UNAMID confirmed 53 cases of human rights violations and abuses involving 149 victims, but the remaining 19 cases involving 104 victims could not be verified owing to various factors, including access restrictions. Of the 72 reported cases, 5 cases involving 39 victims were reportedly perpetrated by government security forces and auxiliary groups, 15 cases involving 16 victims were reportedly perpetrated by male civilians, including one minor, and the remaining 52 cases involving 198 victims were allegedly perpetrated by unidentified armed men, some described by the victims as Arabs. Investigations were initiated in only 17 of the 72 documented cases, resulting in 10 arrests. Police inaction and lack of trust in the police have resulted in many cases not being reported and civilians resorting to resolving issues through local or community leaders.

13. Internally displaced persons were a target in 45 crimes, which led to 6 fatalities, compared with 211 crimes with 48 fatalities in the previous reporting period. Other civilians were affected by 73 crimes resulting in 10 fatalities, including cases of murder (10), armed robbery (7), attempted robbery (4),assault/harassment (22), burglary/break-in (2), abduction (5), shooting (19), attack/ambush (1), threat of violence (2) and livestock theft (1).

14. In South Darfur, the visit of Mr. Al-Bashir to Darfur from 19 to 23 September triggered a massive demonstration in the Kalma camp for internally displaced persons. On 22 September, government forces attempted to disperse the internally displaced persons and stop them from holding a public rally across the Kalma camp, which resulted in heavy shooting between the two sides, killing 5 internally displaced persons and injuring 28 others, as well as two security personnel. A UNAMID medical team deployed to the camp and assisted the local authorities in treating the injured, while engaging the state government and leaders from among the internally displaced persons to resolve the matter peacefully.

15. In West Darfur, farmers and internally displaced persons continued to be attacked and harassed by armed herders, especially in the areas of El Geneina and Masteri. In East Darfur, improved security in the Labado area has prompted some of the returnees to reclaim their farmland from herders, in response to which the latter resorted to the destruction of crops and farms, including four in Yasin locality on 15 August.

16. During an armed robbery in Central Darfur on 5 September, a group of Arab men fired at a group of internally displaced persons, injuring one, in Wadi Faro, 20 km west of Zalingei. On 16 and 17 September, Arab nomads entered Golo town and fired indiscriminately, reportedly in retaliation for an incident of cattle theft by unknown perpetrators in an area between Rockero and Golo. The market in Golo closed temporarily as a result of the shooting, although no casualties were reported. On 29 September, a group of armed Salamat attacked the Bindisi camp for internally displaced persons, 25 km west of Mukjar, killing one and stealing a large number of cattle. On 3 October, seven armed men fired several shots and stole eight solar panels in the Thur East camp for internally displaced persons, 18 km south-east of Nertiti. On the following day, six armed men entered the camp and engaged in indiscriminate shooting, injuring one internally displaced person. On 6 October, an Arab member of the peaceful coexistence committee announced that the internally displaced persons were not allowed to leave the camp to conduct livelihood activities, in particular in areas west of Thur. On the next day, armed men carried out random shootings inside the camp.

III. Political situation

17. The political situation remained relatively stable, but progress relating to the Darfur peace process continued to be modest. On 20 August, an informal consultation with SLA-MM and JEM was held in Berlin to explore ways to revive the peace process. Both groups maintained their rejection of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur as the basis for political negotiations, claiming its shortcomings in relation to security arrangements, the protection of civilians, compensation, land ownership and justice. They also reiterated their objections to the arms collection campaign by the Government, arguing that weapons of tribal militias should not be collected by other militias, such as RSF. On the same day, Qatar reiterated its commitment to the implementation of the Doha Document by signing an agreement to provide $70 million for the construction of two new model villages in each Darfur state. On 11 September, in a meeting with the Chairperson of the former Darfur Regional Authority, Mr. Al-Bashir assured him that directives would be issued for speedy structuring and revitalization of the commissions tasked with completing the unimplemented provisions of the Doha Document.

18. On 22 August, it was reported in the media that Mr. Al-Bashir had held a meeting with the Prime Minister of Chad in Khartoum and discussed, inter alia, strengthening border control through the continuation of the Sudan-Chad joint border forces in West Darfur. On 6 September, the Governor of West Darfur, accompanied by the state security committee and some ministers, visited Adre town in Chad to discuss border issues with their Chadian counterparts. Both parties reportedly agreed to reopen the border following the aforementioned incident involving RSF in Adikong.

19. On 27 August, a breakaway faction of JEM, led by Abubakar Hamid and Souleyman Jamous, accepted the disarmament proposal made by the Government, by which a gathering point in the border area between Chad and Darfur would be identified and the process would begin after the rainy season. The parties requested the President of Chad, Idriss Déby Itno, UNAMID and the international community to ensure a safe and smooth disarmament exercise.

20. On 24 September, the United States of America removed the Sudan from a renewed travel ban imposed in March on six Muslim-majority countries. On 6 October, the United States issued a press statement indicating that it was revoking economic sanctions against the Sudan and the Government of the Sudan, to take effect on 12 October.

IV. Humanitarian situation

21. The overall humanitarian situation remained relatively stable, with no significant displacement recorded in Darfur, although South Sudanese refugees continued to arrive in South and East Darfur, with approximately 3,500 and 195 registered, respectively, from 1 August to 15 September. The spread of acute watery diarrhoea and flash floods continued to compound the dire humanitarian situation in Darfur. In August, floods affected up to 1,700 internally displaced persons in the Zamzam camp in North Darfur and 1,600 internally displaced persons in the Otash camp in South Darfur. Non-food items were distributed to those affected in both camps. Torrential rains also affected 380 families in Niteiga locality and 341 families in the Sereif camp for internally displaced persons in South Darfur. Following verification and the conduct of a needs assessment, non-food items and water, sanitation and hygiene supplies were provided to those affected.

22. From the date on which the first case of acute watery diarrhoea was reported, on 14 June, to 11 October, 674 cases were reported in North Darfur, resulting in 29 deaths, 775 in East Darfur, resulting in 43 deaths, 2,563 in South Darfur, resulting in 123 deaths, 680 in West Darfur, resulting in 20 deaths, and 747 in Central Darfur, resulting in 25 deaths. The World Health Organization (WHO) supported the State Ministry of Health, as well as health partners, by providing supplies for treatment and conducting water quality and vector control. WHO executed 876 house-to-house awareness-raising campaigns promoting good hygiene practices and conditions in East Darfur, reaching 2,876 people, and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) continued its response activities, focusing on case management, case control and communication on disease prevention, social mobilization and monitoring and evaluation.

23. While a humanitarian response is in progress for all current emergencies, major gaps were reported, mainly in the Jebel Marra area, including in the provision of education services, emergency shelter and non-food items. A number of families in three Jebel Marra localities verified by humanitarian agencies have yet to receive non-food items. In Central Darfur, about 5,000 people affected by flooding have yet to receive emergency shelter and non-food items. The delivery of humanitarian assistance was challenged by road conditions as a result of heavy rains.

24. An inter-agency mission was conducted in Zalingei at the end of August, with the objective of initiating consultations with the Central Darfur authorities and humanitarian and development partners regarding the profiling of displacement and return areas.

V. Operating environment

25. The overall operating environment continued to improve, with fewer criminal incidents and fewer restrictions on movement of UNAMID and humanitarian personnel reported.

Attacks and threats of attacks

26. A total of 23 criminal incidents were recorded, compared with 40 in the previous reporting period, reflecting the overall improvement in the security situation on the ground. On 16 August, unidentified perpetrators broke into a World Food Programme (WFP) warehouse in Sortony, North Darfur, and stole a variety of food items. On the same day, in Ed Daein, East Darfur, unidentified perpetrators broke into the residence of a WFP national staff member and stole personal belongings, and, in West Darfur, a local man who stole an electric cable from the team site of UNAMID in Foro Burunga was arrested by mission personnel and handed over to the national police.

27. On 17 August, in El Fasher, North Darfur, three unidentified armed men assaulted and injured two WFP national staff members on board a private vehicle and robbed them of their valuables. One of the victims was taken to El Fasher hospital and discharged the same day and the other was evacuated to Khartoum. On 9 September, unidentified perpetrators broke into the accommodations of a UNAMID police adviser in the Operation's "supercamp" in Nyala and stole personal belongings. On the same day, unidentified armed men opened fire on a UNAMID national staff member in El Fasher. UNAMID national staff members were robbed in El Fasher on 14 and 19 September. On 28 September, in an attempted carjacking in Bursa area in El Fasher town four men shot and wounded a national staff member. On 30 September, unknown perpetrators broke into the

residence of a UNAMID national staff in El Geneina and stole mobile phones. On 7 October, an international aid worker was abducted in El Fasher, North Darfur.

28. Three cases of carjacking were recorded during the reporting period. On 10 August, a United Nations Population Fund vehicle was carjacked in Nyala, South Darfur. In Kabkabiyah, North Darfur, armed men hijacked an ambulance and stole the health equipment of a local non-governmental organization on 14 August, and in Umm Shalabiyah, Central Darfur, an unidentified perpetrator carjacked a local non-governmental organization vehicle on 26 August.

Detention of staff

29. Three UNAMID staff members were arrested and detained during the reporting period. On 23 August, the national police arrested one UNAMID national staff member in El Fasher over alleged involvement in a carjacking incident. In East Darfur, a UNAMID national staff member was arrested on 28 May on allegations of bribing a public officer and espionage against the state made by the National Intelligence and Security Service; the staff member was convicted of bribery in the general court in Ed Daein on 24 August, acquitted of conspiracy against the state and sentenced to two years' imprisonment and a fine of 30,000 Sudanese pounds. Observers alleged that the trial lacked transparency and fell short of international judicial standards. A UNAMID national staff member arrested in Ed Daein on 28 August for allegedly issuing a fake cheque was released on 31 August. A UNAMID national staff member arrested in Nyala by the National Intelligence and Security Service on 23 November 2016 for alleged espionage was released from detention in Khartoum on 31 August. On 8 October, a UNAMID national staff member was arrested for failing to provide financial support to his children in Nyala but was released the following day. On 5 October, another UNAMID national staff member was arrested in Nyala, allegedly for issuing two false bank cheques, but released on 12 October after paying a fine.

Access restrictions

30. There were two incidents of access restriction during the reporting period. On 19 August, a government military intelligence officer restricted a UNAMID national staff member from entering the UNAMID terminal at the airport in El Fasher, allegedly for security reasons. On 6 September, following discussions with the Sudanese authorities, the national staff member was allowed to resume his duties at the airport. On 10 October, a UNAMID patrol tasked with carrying out a project inspection mission to various locations in Murnei town, West Darfur, was denied access by the National Intelligence and Security Service and military intelligence officers, who claimed not to have received notification of the mission.

31. UNAMID did not experience any air movement restrictions in the period under review. There were occasional bureaucratic impediments, however, including delays in the approval of flight schedules, prohibition of flights between team sites in different sectors, limits placed on air operation hours and the denial of use of the airport in El Obeid, North Kordofan, as an alternate airport for emergencies. On 11 October, in Golo, Central Darfur, SAF forced the entry of two soldiers with gunshot injuries into a United Nations Humanitarian Air Service aircraft bound for Zalingei.

32. Humanitarian activities continued without significant interference from government authorities, and several missions were successfully conducted, including to Jebel Marra. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) conducted a registration mission in Central Darfur from 7 to 20 August. On 10 September, an inter-agency assessment mission was carried out in Deribat, South

Darfur. WFP food distribution in Golo, Central Darfur, was successfully conducted, and local authorities approved regular United Nations humanitarian flights to Rockero. Significant progress was made in the issuance of notifications, travel permits, technical agreements and visas. Overall compliance with the revised humanitarian directives issued in December 2016, however, remained inconsistent. In Central Darfur, access to areas in eastern Nertiti required prior approval by the Governor and the State Security Committee, and a request for an inter-agency mission to eastern Nertiti submitted on 29 July is still pending. Humanitarians remained unable to access areas of Darfur under the control of SLA/AW, including Kutrum, Golol, and Boldong, with authorities citing the inability to ensure security for humanitarians as the reason therefor.

33. Humanitarian workers also experienced difficulties in getting authorization from the National Intelligence and Security Service and the military intelligence officers, notwithstanding their having received approvals from the Humanitarian Aid Commission. For example, the IOM registration mission in Aynsero in North Darfur was suspended by the National Intelligence and Security Service, even though it had been initially approved by the Humanitarian Aid Commission. In addition, a UNICEF mission planned for 20 to 23 August to eastern Jebel Marra was put on hold by the Government for security reasons.

Visas and customs clearance

34. The Government granted 411 visas for UNAMID, including 74 for military personnel, 196 for police personnel, 61 for official visitors, 58 for contractors, 14 for international staff members and 8 for dependants. A total of 246 visa requests have remained pending beyond the normal period of 15 days, some of them since January 2016. They include 42 for police personnel, 90 for contractors, 43 for official visitors, 35 for civilian staff members, 24 for military personnel, 11 for United Nations Volunteers and 1 for a consultant. The vacancy rate for the Human Rights Section remains unchanged, at 44 per cent, while 4 per cent of the overall 17 per cent vacancy rate for the Operation's international civilian staff is attributable to pending visas.

35. The Sudanese authorities progressively released shipments and containers from Port Sudan. Currently, 63 shipments are pending release, some of them since April 2015. They include one armoured personnel carrier, 10 vehicles, communications and information technology equipment, generators, submersible pumps and spare parts for vehicles. The delays have resulted in demurrage charges and other costs associated with the inspection and repair of equipment incurred by troop- and police-contributing countries. UNAMID is still awaiting further information from the Government on the new system for the certificate of taxation exemption for goods imported in 2016 and 2017.

VI. Progress towards achievement of the strategic objectives of the Mission

Protection of civilians

36. Integrated field protection teams conducted 21 missions in North Darfur, 8 in West Darfur and 2 in Central Darfur. In North Darfur, the teams conducted daily visits to the Korma camp for internally displaced persons, together with surrounding areas, including Kundi, Tawilah, Shoba Wadi, Hillet, Hibrahim, Gozil Na'im, Bandago, Basinga, Simayat, Dekere and Kurula. The teams interacted with local communities and received reports of harassment and intimidation against internally displaced persons who were collecting firewood and grass and farming. In West

Darfur, the teams were informed of similar challenges in Habila, Kanery, Tajuna, Afandi, Almashruwa, Himmeda, Kamkam, Kurti and Azerni, including physical assaults in farming areas, denial of access to land, destruction of crops and violence against women and girls. In Central Darfur, the team visited Shawa, a farming area located 15 km east of Zalingei, in response to reports of security threats from nomads faced by farmers.

37. On the basis of input from those communities, UNAMID categorized 18 farming areas around Zalingei, Nertiti, Mukjar and Azum in Central Darfur as hotspots, although access to the areas has been difficult owing to the road conditions during the rainy season. UNAMID also intensified patrols in farming areas around Sortony, Tawilah, Umm Barru, Shangil Tobaya and Saraf Omra in North Darfur.

38. The military component of UNAMID conducted a total of 10,311 patrols, including 213 long-range patrols and 1,366 night patrols, which amounted to 2,420 visits to villages and 1,445 visits to camps for internally displaced persons. The police component of UNAMID conducted 3,924 confidence-building patrols to camps for internally displaced persons and 2,958 patrols to address the security needs of internally displaced persons, in particular women and children engaged in livelihood activities outside the camps. In addition, 304 joint patrols with 1,176 community policing volunteers were carried out as part of crime prevention initiatives.

39. The uniformed personnel of UNAMID provided 195 round-trip escorts for humanitarian partners in support of the delivery of humanitarian assistance, inter-agency and verification assessments, the distribution and monitoring of food and non-food items and operational activities. In addition, UNAMID continued to provide daily escorts to humanitarian partners undertaking the water, sanitation and hygiene initiative of trucking water from the Kube to the Sortony gathering sites in North Darfur, which host over 21,500 internally displaced persons, and regular armed escorts for the transport of humanitarian supplies between Sortony and Kabkabiyah in North Darfur. Under special arrangements with WFP, UNAMID armed escorts facilitated seven WFP logistics convoys of 32 trucks delivering 629 tons of food and non-food items in North and South Darfur. UNAMID continued to provide security for WFP warehouses in various locations, including El Fasher and Sortony in North Darfur.

40. UNAMID conducted six training sessions on human rights and the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence, community policing and family and child protection for 97 internally displaced persons (93 men and 4 women), as well as 13 training sessions on community policing, human rights and the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence, and health care for 424 internally displaced persons and community policing volunteers (247 men and 177 women). Between 13 and 24 August, 100 newly recruited prison officers were provided a two-week training in El Fasher, North Darfur, and Nyala, South Darfur, to enhance their capacity and promote a human rights-based approach to prison management.

41. UNAMID continued to follow up with local judicial authorities on the status of investigations, arrests and trials. In addition to a trial in El Geneina, West Darfur, of suspects charged with the rape of two female teachers, UNAMID monitored the court case involving two members of the Rizeigat militia accused of killing eight internally displaced persons from the Sortony camp in May 2016. In response to a rare instance of the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Crimes in Darfur pursuing accountability measures against Arab militias, armed Rizeigat in Sortony blocked the road between Sortony and Kabkabiyah, demanding the release of the two suspects. UNAMID provides support to the Office on compliance with fair trial

standards and makes the logistical arrangements for witnesses from Sortony to appear before the court in El Fasher.

42. Support from UNAMID enabled the operationalization during the reporting period of a new multipurpose court in El Geneina, which includes a rural and a district court, along with offices for judges and separate detention facilities for men and women. This allows improved oversight of the rural court and promotes access to justice for the population by reducing travel costs and facilitating the appeal of cases by the district court. In addition, as a result of UNAMID advocacy, the Government is in the process of building a correctional facility that emphasizes prisoner rehabilitation in Nyala, South Darfur, in compliance with international standards.

43. On 16 August, SLA/MM renewed its order issued on 17 December 2013 prohibiting the recruitment and use of child soldiers, sexual violence against children, the abduction of children, the killing and maiming of children and attacks on schools and hospitals. Between 15 August and 11 September, UNAMID undertook 19 field missions to hospitals, prisons and camps for internally displaced persons to monitor and report allegations of grave violations of children's rights. UNAMID also conducted six training sessions for 481 participants from local communities, women's groups and prison and police officers. In line with Security Council resolutions 1261 (1999), 1460 (2003) and 1612 (2005), UNAMID conducted 14 training sessions benefiting 628 peacekeepers and associated personnel (87 women and 541 men) to increase the awareness and knowledge of mission personnel on child rights and child protection.

44. UNAMID, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme and the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, supported the launch of the third phase of the reintegration process for 350 ex-combatants demobilized between 2014 and 2016. On 21 August, the reintegration programme began for 200 demobilized ex-combatants in Zalingei, Central Darfur, and for 150 ex-combatants in Nyala, South Darfur. In addition, UNAMID completed 15 community stabilization projects, including 3 in South Darfur, 5 in North Darfur and 7 in West Darfur, and conducted vocational skills training for 1,200 at-risk youth in Shattay and Bulbul-Dalal Anagara in South Darfur, Umm Barru in North Darfur and Tandalti in West Darfur.

45. UNAMID teams conducted general explosive hazard assessments and disposal operations in 10 villages across Darfur, with particular focus on Jebel Marra. As a result, 11 hazardous areas were cleared and 241 items of unexploded ordnance destroyed. Mine action teams surveyed four UNAMID team sites earmarked for closure prior to their handover to the Government. UNAMID also conducted training on explosive hazards across Darfur, which benefited 12,389 people, including 2,003 men, 3,314 women, 3,790 boys and 3,282 girls.

Support to the Darfur peace process and the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

46. The African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur/Head of UNAMID continued to engage with the movements that were non-signatories to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and the Government, with the aim of the resumption of talks towards the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement and subsequent negotiations. In response to the letter sent by the Joint Special Representative on 11 August regarding the impasse of the process, the Government reiterated its insistence on the Doha Document as the basis for negotiations, while the non-signatories maintained their view of the need for a cessation of hostilities agreement before proceeding to negotiate further. On

30 August, the Prime Minister and First Vice-President of the Sudan reiterated the position of the Government in a meeting with the Joint Special Representative.

47. On 15 August, UNAMID met with the Commissioner of the Darfur Land Commission, who provided a briefing on the progress of the Darfur land-use mapping database, with the assistance of a German consulting firm. Those data will constitute the basis for the Land Act. UNAMID also met with the Commissioner and the Executive Director of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission on 20 August, who requested the support of the Operation in implementing peacebuilding activities in the following priority areas: (a) Mellit locality in North Darfur, targeting the Berti, Zayadiya and Awlad Omran communities; (b) Kutum and Waha localities in North Darfur, targeting all communities in the area; (c) Um Dukhun in Central Darfur, targeting the Ta'a'ishah, Salamat, Beni Halba and Misseriya communities; (d) Mouli area in West Darfur, targeting the Arab and Masalit communities; and (e) Graida in South Darfur, targeting the Masalit, Rizeigat, Salamat, Fallata and Habbaniya communities.

Mitigation of intercommunal violence

48. In collaboration with the Sudanese authorities, the United Nations country team and other stakeholders, UNAMID continued efforts to resolve the conflict between the Fallata and the Salamat in South Darfur, holding two meetings with community leaders and the National Intelligence and Security Service, on 17 and 21 August. In Central Darfur, two meetings were held, on 27 and 30 August, to resolve the tension between the Mahariya and SLA/AW elements, involving local officials and peaceful coexistence committee members. Similarly, in West Darfur on 20 August, UNAMID held a meeting in Arara to follow up on the implementation of the peace agreement between the Najaa and the Awlad Rashid.

49. UNAMID, jointly with the United Nations Development Programme, conducted workshops on peaceful coexistence, confidence-building and conflict prevention and management in North Darfur from 28 to 30 August and in South Darfur on 28 and 29 August, bringing together 220 participants, including 77 women, internally displaced persons, young people and nomads. To mitigate seasonal farming-related communal conflicts in the context of the upcoming harvest season, UNAMID held three meetings in North Darfur, on 16, 22 and 27 August, two meetings in West Darfur, on 16 and 21 August, one meeting in South Darfur, on 15 August, one meeting in East Darfur, on 6 September, and one meeting in Khartoum, on 15 August. The meetings brought together diverse stakeholders, including representatives of the native administrations, commissioners, local authorities and community leaders, representatives of the peaceful coexistence and agricultural protection committees, internally displaced persons, farmers and nomadic herders.

VII. Progress in the implementation of the recommendations of the strategic report

50. Pursuant to resolution 2363 (2017), UNAMID continued to implement phase one of its reconfiguration, including the closure of 11 team sites and the reduction of the authorized strength to 11,395 military personnel and 2,888 police personnel. As at 15 October, six team sites had been closed, namely, Muhajiriyah in East Darfur, Edd al-Fursan and Tulus in South Darfur, and Maliha, Mellit and Um Kaddadah in North Darfur, while the closure of four additional team sites is expected to commence in the second half of October. The team site in Shaeria, East Darfur, has been handed over from the military unit to the formed police unit of UNAMID.

51. Two of the three battalions to be withdrawn in phase one have been repatriated, except for their contingent-owned equipment and the rear parties, and the departure of the third battalion was scheduled to commence on 16 October. In addition, two formed police units had been repatriated as at the end of September. Individual police officers have also been redeployed from the closing team sites to the remaining ones.

Jebel Marra task force

52. The establishment of the Jebel Marra task force is on track. Nine existing team sites in Central, North and South Darfur States have redirected their activities to address the humanitarian needs of the population in the area, while there have been promising discussions with the Government of the Sudan in Khartoum and the local government on the establishment of the temporary operating base in Golo. Following the successful meeting of the Tripartite Mechanism in New York, on 22 September, and the meeting of the Joint Special Representative with the Governor of Central Darfur, on 7 October, technical arrangements are taking place for the ground preparations of UNAMID operations in Golo. Meanwhile, UNAMID is in the process of developing a tailored protection strategy for Jebel Marra and finalizing the headquarters arrangements for the Jebel Marra task force.

Civilian staffing review

53. The civilian staffing review of UNAMID, which was carried out in August to adjust the level of civilian personnel commensurate with the drawdown of uniformed personnel, has completed its task. While the recommendations of the staffing review are being finalized, UNAMID has recommended the reduction of 562 posts, to be implemented over the next 12 months in two phases, which will be reflected in the revised 2017/18 budget.

Joint financing strategy for sustaining peace in Darfur of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and the United Nations country team

54. UNAMID and the United Nations country team finalized the integrated strategic framework for 2017–2019 at their joint meeting held in Khartoum on 26 September. Focusing on the rule of law and human rights, durable solutions to displacement and peacebuilding for human security, the strategy sets out the common framework through which to tackle those issues in a consistent and complementary manner, based on comparative advantage and division of labour. The development of a joint financing strategy for implementing the framework is in progress, and it is aimed at identifying measures to ensure the Government's engagement in and ownership of those issues, the further geographical prioritization and sequencing of tasks, and outreach to a wide range of partners to mobilize the resources necessary for sustainable peace in Darfur.

VIII. Financial aspects

55. The General Assembly, by its resolution 71/310 of 30 June 2017, authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the Operation in an amount not exceeding $486.0 million for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2017.

56. As at 10 October 2017, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNAMID amounted to $141.0 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $2,400.3 million.

57. Reimbursement of troop and formed police costs has been made for the period up to 31 August 2017, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 30 June 2017, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

IX. Observations

58. Progress towards achieving comprehensive peace in Darfur through a negotiated political settlement to the conflict remains elusive. While the parties proclaim the desire to continue the negotiations, they set preconditions that constrain the progression of the talks. I urge both the Government of the Sudan and the armed movements to continue honouring their unilateral ceasefires and to resume talks aimed at reaching an agreement on the cessation of hostilities. In this regard, I commend the continuous efforts made by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, led by the former President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki and supported by the Joint Special Representative, to bring the parties to the negotiating table. I urge the parties to cooperate in the mediation in seeking lasting solutions to the crisis.

59. While the disarmament of the civilian population and the militia is one of the provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and a prerequisite to establishing sustainable peace, without a wider consensus on the way forward to end the conflict in Darfur, the arms collection campaign launched by the Government has the potential to exacerbate the existing divisions within society, notwithstanding the merit of reducing the circulation of weapons that fuel violence. The developments to date indicate that the process has generated uneven outcomes across the Darfur states and mixed reactions, which, if not managed carefully, could lead to unanticipated consequences politically. In addition, the militia issue needs to be addressed in the context of wider security sector reform and adequate investments into alternative livelihoods.

60. In accordance with the decisions of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, UNAMID has made progress on the reconfiguration process. I thank the Government for its cooperation and support in the repatriation of uniformed units and the closure of the team sites and appeal for the completion of the preparations towards establishing a temporary operating base in Golo. I am encouraged by the overall progress made in the issuance of visas and the release of containers and ask the Government to remove all outstanding impediments, including pending visas, customs clearance and the certificate of tax exemption, in accordance with the status-of-forces agreement.

61. Ensuring that the drawdown of UNAMID is accompanied by the further stabilization of the situation in Darfur is the collective responsibility of the Government, the United Nations system and local stakeholders in Darfur. Together with the African Union, the Secretariat has initiated preparations for the midterm review of the reconfiguration by the end of 2017, as mandated by the Security Council.

62. In conclusion, I would like to thank the Joint Special Representative, Jeremiah Nyamane Kingsley Mamabolo, and all the personnel of UNAMID, the United Nations and the humanitarian community who continue their relentless efforts to improve the lives of the people of Darfur. I commend my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan, Nicholas Haysom, and the former President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki and the former President of Nigeria Abdulsalami Abubakar of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel for their remarkable efforts to resolve the conflict in Darfur.

Map No. 4327 Rev. 29 UNITED NATIONS
August 2017 (Colour)

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

United Nations S/2017/908*

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 October 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 27 October 2017 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Committee dated 27 October 2017, submitted in accordance with paragraph 21 of Council resolution 2094 (2013) (see annex).

I would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Sebastiano **Cardi**
Chair
Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

* Reissued for technical reasons on 7 November 2017.

17-19145* (E) 071117

Please recycle

Annex

Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) prepared in accordance with paragraph 21 of resolution 2094 (2013)

On 7 March 2013, the Security Council by its resolution 2094 (2013) directed the Committee to review and update the items contained in the lists specified in paragraph 5 (b) of resolution 2087 (2013), namely INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 2 (nuclear related items), no later than 7 March 2014 and on an annual basis thereafter.

In order to fulfil these tasks, the Committee considered the revised list of items contained in the lists specified in paragraph 5 (b) of resolution 2087 (2013).

On 27 October 2017, the Committee acted in line with the Security Council's directive and approved the following:

Update to the items contained in the lists specified in paragraph 5 (b) of resolution 2087 (2013)

The Committee determines that the list of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 is superseded by the list of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2. The list of items contained in INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 shall thus be subject to the measures imposed in paragraphs 8 (a), (b) and (c) of Security Council resolution 1718 (2006).

17-19145

United Nations S/2017/909

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 November 2017
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 27 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 25 to 27 October 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter and its annex to be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) V. **Nebenzia**

17-19281 (E) 021117 031117

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Annex to the letter dated 27 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (25 October 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported seven incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: four in Aleppo, two in Homs and one in Ladhiqiyah.

The Turkish representative office has reported two violations in the following Governorates: one in Hama and one in Damascus.

Most incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out two humanitarian operations for the delivery of food products to Umm Adasah in Aleppo Governorate, with a total weight of 1.7 tons, and Akrad al-Dasiniyah in Homs Governorate, with a total weight of 2.1 tons.

In total, 1,658 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,258.3 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 174 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 61,512 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire regime agreements were signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 2,259.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah Governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (26 October 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported five incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: four in Aleppo and one in Damascus.

The Turkish representative office has reported four violations in the following Governorates: three in Damascus and one in Hama.

Most incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out a humanitarian operation in Darusha in Damascus Governorate, during which food products with a total weight of 3.6 tons were delivered to the local population.

In total, 1,659 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,261.8 tons.

Two humanitarian convoys were sent through the United Nations. In Tall Shihab and Jizah in Dar'a Governorate, food products and domestic items were delivered, with a total weight of 147 tons. Over the course of 24 hours, medical assistance was provided to 206 inhabitants. In total, medical assistance has been provided to 61,851 inhabitants. t

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements were signed with populated areas over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 2,259.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Damascus and Qunaytirah Governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (27 October 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported three incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: two in Aleppo and one in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has reported three violations in the following Governorates: one in Idlib and two in Damascus.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation.

In total, 1,660 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,263.9 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 42 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 61,893 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, one ceasefire regime agreement has been signed with Kafr Laha, in Homs Governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,260.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Damascus and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

United Nations S/2017/910

Security Council

Distr.: General
31 October 2017
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 30 October 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the position of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the forty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015) and 2332 (2016) (S/2017/902).

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reiterates the concerns that it raised in its previous responses to reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the aforementioned Security Council resolutions. It stresses that the current report, despite some improvements, is still in dire need of greater clarity, transparency and professionalism in order to be credible. It also stresses that in preparing their reports, the authors should exhibit greater respect for the provisions of the above-mentioned United Nations resolutions, and in particular the principles of full commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic and the provision of humanitarian support within Syria without politicization or selectivity.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic also draws attention to the following:

The current report, like its predecessors, suffers from the serious defect that its authors have relied on politicized sources that have no credibility, while they ignore not only reliable Government sources, but even reports of United Nations representatives operating in Syria that acknowledge the efforts of the Syrian Government, its cooperation on humanitarian relief and the facilities that it provides for their work.

Despite showing a willingness to turn over a new leaf in cooperation with the Syrian Government and move away from certain practices of their predecessors, the authors of the report are still using it as a periodic opportunity to relay unfounded claims and allegations with no basis in fact in order to put a bad face on the Syrian Government's efforts in the service of the political objectives of certain States that have a negative influence within the United Nations. Among those objectives is promoting the idea that there is an "urgent need" to extend the mandate of resolution 2165 (2014). That is evident, just by way of example, from paragraph 7 in Box 1, paragraph 20 and paragraph 41, and from the inclusion of an annex that

contains undocumented accusations and turns a blind eye to the crimes of terrorist organizations with various names and loyalties.

The Syrian Government rejects the Secretariat's continued promotion of cross-border assistance, and reiterates that such assistance is ineffective, given that most of it falls into the hands of armed terrorist groups deployed in the targeted areas. That is a fact acknowledged by both the United Nations itself and the States seeking to extend resolution 2165 (2014). The Syrian Government reiterates that the United Nations Monitoring Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot verify that such assistance is making its way into the hands of deserving civilian recipients. We also remind you that the Bab al-Hawa, Bab al-Salamah and Ramtha crossings are entry points for arms, materiel and ammunition being smuggled to armed terrorist groups in Syria. The Government strongly rejects the authors' continued bias in favour of Turkey and Jordan when discussing the delivery of cross-border assistance. It also categorically condemns and rejects any use of the Fish Khabur crossing — which is not mentioned in resolution 2165 (2014) — by either the United Nations or international non-governmental organizations supported by the United Nations, which are operating illegally in certain parts of Syria. The Syrian Government reiterates that the Syrian Arab Red Crescent stands ready to monitor the delivery of humanitarian assistance to its intended recipients, but the Secretariat has in the past rejected that proposal.

The Syrian Government insists that the authors of the report should tell Member States the truth about significant recent progress in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to deserving recipients following the liberation by the Syrian Government and its allies of most of Syrian territory from the abomination of terrorism. The Syrian Government objects to the characterization by the authors of the report of operations mentioned in paragraph 7 as "overtaking" areas, when the correct characterization would have been "liberating from terrorism". The Syrian Government notes that in the month of September, in keeping with its commitment to providing humanitarian assistance to those in need, it agreed to the establishment of a trilateral mechanism for cooperation among the Syrian Government, the Russian side and the United Nations to coordinate and enhance the delivery of humanitarian access. That mechanism has already achieved positive results over the recent period.

The Syrian Government categorically rejects the continued bias shown by the authors of the report towards the so-called "international coalition" and its members, which is evident from the report's attempts to gloss over massacres and acts of destruction and sabotage committed by that coalition and its allied militias, their use of internationally prohibited weapons against civilians in Syria, and other violations of international law, international humanitarian law and human rights that amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Syrian Government again calls for the immediate dissolution of that illegitimate coalition and an end to its crimes against Syrians.

It is unfortunate that notwithstanding calls from the Syrian Government and members of the Security Council, the authors of the report have failed to fulfil their responsibility to give the global public a true picture of the economic and humanitarian suffering caused by the unilateral coercive economic measures imposed on Syria by the United States of America, the European Union and other States. Those measures are having numerous negative impacts. They have even affected the activities of United Nations agencies and foreign non-governmental organizations operating in Syria and brought about the suspension of projects vital to responding to the needs of Syrians.

The Syrian Government stresses that United Nations officials operating in Syria should not have anything to do with any separatist entities, illegal "local councils", or unlicensed charitable associations, especially given that such entities are more often than not attached to terrorist groups active in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.

The Syrian Government stands by its position rejecting continued efforts by the authors of the report to legitimize the terrorist groups deployed in Syria by calling them by illegitimate names, such as "non-State armed opposition" or "moderate armed opposition". In particular, it rejects the report's reference to "non-State opposition groups" in the Jawbar and Yarmuk areas, even though everyone knows that the groups deployed in those areas are in fact the Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorist organizations. The Syrian Government believes that authors of the report should be held accountable for their irresponsible approach, which is of a piece with attempts by terrorist groups such as the terrorist "Levant Liberation Organization" — that is, the Nusrah Front — to legitimize their presence in certain parts of Syria by calling their headquarters and branches "charitable associations".

The Syrian Government once again condemns the fact that the authors of the report have ignored the blatant Turkish intervention in Syria and occupation of part of its territory, and once again calls on the Security Council to fulfil its responsibilities by putting an end to that occupation.

The Syrian Government regrets that the authors of the report fail to acknowledge that donors are not living up to their financial commitments, and are setting politicized conditions for financing international organizations operating in Syria, which is one of the main things obstructing the humanitarian response to Syrians in need and blocking support for Government plans aimed at rehabilitating infrastructure and returning refugees to their regions once security and stability are restored.

The Syrian Government notes that statistics from United Nations offices in Syria confirm that the Syrian Government granted 955 entry and residence visas to United Nations staff during the period between January and September 2017, or 86 per cent out of the 1,109 applications received. It rejected only 41 (that figure should be 29 according to Syrian Government statistics). The remaining applications are being processed. Meanwhile, the Syrian Government has granted hundreds of visas to the International Committee of the Red Cross and representatives of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies from countries around the world, as well as to numerous representatives of international non-governmental organizations and humanitarian bodies from various different States.

In keeping with its belief that civic associations have a role to play in humanitarian work as a national partner, and with a view to enhancing such work, the Syrian Government has set up a mechanism to develop cooperation between civic associations and international organizations operating in Syria that will allow the United Nations and its agencies to work together with all duly licensed civic associations and charitable institutions without being limited to associations entered on the list used previously.

With regard to the number of international non-governmental organizations approved to operate in the Syrian Arab Republic, the correct figure is 27 such organizations to date, not 23 as appearing in the report. Applications submitted by other organizations for permission to operate in Syria are under consideration.

The Syrian Government reiterates its stated position regarding the International Criminal Court and the calls that have been made to refer the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic to that Court, and stresses that the Court is not competent to address the situation in Syria. Moreover, the Court has lost all credibility and has been transformed into a political tool that is used by certain parties to attack specific States for sordid political ends that have nothing to do with the requirements of justice. The Syrian Government also reiterates what it stated in its letter to the Secretary-General regarding the serious legal flaws in the resolution on the "international investigation and accountability mechanism" (A/71/799).

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms its long-standing position that the crisis in Syria requires a political solution based on intra-Syrian dialogue under Syrian leadership without foreign intervention and without preconditions. We remind the Secretariat that the success of the political process and any significant improvement in the humanitarian situation will depend, above all, on creating a climate conducive to a serious and non-politicized international and regional commitment to fighting terrorism and on an immediate end to the unilateral coercive economic measures being imposed on the Syrian people. The Syrian Government stresses that it has played a constructive role in the success of the Astana and Geneva meetings.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic once again calls on the Security Council to prevail on the States that support and finance armed terrorist groups to refrain from so doing, in implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions on combating terrorism and the financing thereof, in particular resolutions 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015). Compliance with and enforcement of those resolutions is the key to resolving the situation in Syria and delivering unprecedented humanitarian assistance to those in need in Syria.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mounzer **Mounzer**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.